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INTRODUCTION
What is the source of threats to religious liberty? One might
also ask the question the other way around: What is the problem
that religious liberty is designed to solve?
For nearly five hundred years in Western thought, the
* Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law and Associate Dean for
Research, The University of Texas School of Law. This paper was originally
given as the 1994 Lockhart Lecture at the University of Minnesota Law School.
I have added footnotes and expanded on the text, but I have tried to retain
some of the scope and style of the original lecture. Many volumes of history
have been written on the Reformation; I have resisted the illusion that I can do
any more than summarize broad themes and illustrate with selected examples.
I am grateful to the students and faculty at Minnesota for insightful questions
and comments, to Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Andrew M. Greeley, Sanford
Levinson, Michael McConnell, LA. Powe, and John Witte for helpful comments
on an earlier draft, and to Nathan Adams and Christine Burgess for research
assistance. The seed for this paper was planted in conversation at a conference
sponsored by the Liberty Fund; the papers from that conference are forthcoming
in RELIGIOUS LMERTY IN WESTERN THOUGHT (Noel B. Reynolds & W. Cole
Durham, Jr. eds., 1996).
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dominant model of the problem to be solved has been the
religious conflict in the wake of the Reformation. The Refor-
mation is important to American constitutional law because it
was salient recent history to those who wrote our Religion
Clauses, and because for most Americans who learned anything
about religion in their history courses, the problem of religious
liberty is typified by the persecutions that drove Pilgrims,
Puritans, Quakers, and Catholics to found colonies in Plymouth,
Massachusetts Bay, Pennsylvania, and Maryland.
The Reformation-era conflict was in some ways similar to
religious conflict before and since. But like all great events, it
was in some ways unique. As Justice Black summarized it in
Everson v. Board of Education:
Catholics had persecuted Protestants, Protestants had persecuted
Catholics, Protestant sects had persecuted other Protestant sects,
Catholics of one shade of belief had persecuted Catholics of another
shade of belief, and all of these had from time to time persecuted Jews.
... [Mien and women had been fined, cast in jail, cruelly tortured, and
killed.'
We can all agree that these events should not be repeated.
These events were so obviously evil that the lessons to be
learned may seem equally obvious-so obvious that there is little
need to discuss them.
The relative dearth of explicit discussion has been a
mistake. I have gradually come to realize that different
commentators have drawn quite different lessons from this
history. Americans do not agree on what was wrong with the
Reformation-era conflicts, and consequently we do not agree on
what lessons to draw for our own time. In part we can disagree
about what lessons to draw because we have only the vaguest
idea what actually happened. Just what was the Diet of Worms,
and who forced whom to live on it?
More important, what was the dominant evil of these
conflicts? Was it that people suffered for religion, or that
religions imposed suffering? Is the dominant lesson that religion
has a "dark side" that is "inherently intolerant and
persecutory,"2 or that efforts to coerce religious belief or practice
cause great human suffering?
Any answer must begin with historical facts, not vague
1. 330 U.S. 1, 9 (1947).
2. William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843
(1993).
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impressions or religious or secular prejudices. I therefore begin
with some basic history. Nothing in this historical review is
original or sophisticated, and few of the facts are controversial.
I am summarizing from standard sources in very broad strokes.
But there is a theme to my summary: the role of the State in the
religious persecutions that gave rise to our Religion Clauses. I
follow with an equally broad overview of contemporary religious
conflict; then I compare and contrast the two periods. Much has
changed since the Reformation, but one constant is that the
State punishes people for disapproved religious practices.
I. THE REFORMATION ERA
A. THE CONTINENT
The beginning of the Reformation is conventionally dated to
1517, when Martin Luther circulated his Ninety-Five Theses on
indulgences.' Of course Luther had predecessors, such as
Wycliffe and Hus more than a century before.4 But it was
Luther and then Calvin who first launched successful religious
movements, perhaps because they had the enormous advantage
of the printing press.'
The Ninety-Five Theses circulated widely, although
historians now doubt the legend that Luther nailed them to the
church door in Wittenberg.6 The Theses provoked immediate
accusations of heresy,7 but only dilatory action. There followed
more than three years of political maneuvering, during which
time Luther issued a series of books, sermons, and public
statements that escalated his quarrel with Rome from an attack
on indulgences to a denial of the authority of popes and church
councils and a redefinition of the sacraments and the means of
3. LEWIs W. SPITZ, THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION 1517-1559, at 1 (1985).
4. JOHN M. TODD, REFORMATION 84-93 (1971) [hereinafter TODD,
REFORMATION].
5. See H.G. HAILE, LUTHER: AN EXPERIENT IN BIOGRAPHY 165-74 (1980)
(describing the explosive distribution of Luther's works); SPITZ, supra note 3, at
88-93 ("[T]he Reformation was the first historical movement in the post-
Gutenberg era and the printing press made it possible.").
6. HAILE, supra note 5, at 177 & n.8; ERWIN ISERLOH, THE THESES WERE
NOT POSTED: LUTHER BETWEEN REFORM AND REFORMATION 46-97 (1968).
7. See SPITZ, supra note 3, at 66-69 (noting that the Theses were
promulgated October 31, 1517, and that by mid-December, Luther's bishop had
sent them to Rome with a request for heresy proceedings).
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salvation.'
The reasons for the delay in pursuing Luther lay in secular
politics and power relations. The Church had to line up its
temporal support, because only the State could execute heretics.
And the Pope had to deal with the rulers of the German states
on other issues-including revenue, a proposed Crusade, and the
election of a new Holy Roman Emperor-that seemed more
important than one heretic monk.9 Eventually, Pope Leo X
declared Luther to be a heretic and excommunicated him,' ° but
even then he and his representatives continued to delay the
effective date of the decree."
Charles V, the new emperor, summoned Luther before the
Diet-the imperial council-meeting in the City of Worms, and
demanded that he recant. 2 It was here, before this secular
body, that Luther made his famous reply: "Here I stand, I cannot
do otherwise." 3 It was an innovation that the Diet exercised
independent judgment on a question of heresy, but it was no
innovation that only "the secular arm" could execute a heretic. 4
Luther had come to Worms under a guarantee of safe
conduct, which the Emperor honored. 5 The Edict of Worms
gave Luther twenty-one days in which to flee, at the end of
which he was "to be regarded as a convicted heretic," his
8. For detailed accounts of this period, see generally ROLAND H. BAINTON,
HERE I STAND: A LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHER 84-166 (1950) [hereinafter BAINTON,
LUTHER]; JOHN M. TODD, LUTHER: A LIFE 120-86 (1982) [hereinafter TODD,
LUTHER].
9. For summaries of the political considerations, see ROLAND H. BAINTON,
THE REFORMATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 54-55 (1952) [hereinafter
BAINTON, REFORMATION]; TODD, LUTHER, supra note 8, at 129-31; BARBARA W.
TUCHMAN, THE MARCH OF FOLLY 115-16 (1984).
10. The papal bull is quoted in BAINTON, LUTHER, supra note 8, at 147.
11. See id. at 170, 177 (reporting that the Pope's representative to the
Emperor returned the bull of excommunication to Rome for modification);
BAINTON, REFORMATION, supra note 9, at 58-59 (reporting an earlier delay for
delivery of the bull to Luther, plus sixty days in which Luther could recant, plus
further delay for "political considerations").
12. BAINTON, LUTHER, supra note 8, at 178-86; SPITZ, supra note 3, at 74-
75.
13. There is some doubt whether he said those words, but there was no
doubt of his meaning. See BAINTON, LUTHER, supra note 8, at 185 (quoting a
similar statement from the transcript, and the famous quotation from the
earliest printed version); SPITZ, supra note 3, at 75 (quoting the printed version
and stating that "[plandemonium broke loose in the hall" after Luther spoke).
14. J.D. MACKIE, THE EARLIER TUDORS 1485-1558, at 549 (1952); EDWARD
PETERS, INQUISITION 67, 94 (1988).
15. SPITZ, supra note 3, at 74-75.
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followers "condemned," and his books "eradicated from the
memory of man." 6 But the decree could not be enforced;
Luther had too much support, and the Empire was little more
than a loose confederation." At first Frederick of Saxony
offered Luther refuge and protection;" later, Luther returned
to Wittenberg and gradually concluded that the authorities were
afraid to try to arrest him.'9 In 1524, the Diet of Nurnberg
decreed only that "the Edict of Worms should be enforced in so
far as might be possible." 0
Protestantism spread rapidly, quickly splitting into its most
basic branches.2' Lutheranism spread through much of Ger-
many and all of Scandinavia;22 Calvinism spread from Geneva
to the French Huguenots, the Dutch Reformers, the English
Puritans, the Scots Presbyterians, and the American colonies in
New England.23 The Anabaptists (today's Mennonites, Amish,
Quakers, and the like), the radical wing of the Reformation,
spread across Europe but dominated nowhere.' Some scholars
would add the Anglicans as a fourth distinct branch, a unique
combination of Lutheran, Calvinist, Catholic, and nationalist
elements.25
Protestantism spread in part for religious reasons: charis-
16. See BAINTON, LUTHER, supra note 8, at 189 (quoting the Edict of
Worms).
17. See TODD, LUTHER, supra note 8, at 215 ("It began to seem that much
of the established structure of society was a paper construction.").
18. BAINTON, REFORMATION, supra note 9, at 62; SPITZ, supra note 3, at 76.
19. See TODD, LUTHER, supra note 8, at 228-41 (describing Luther's return
to Wittenberg and authorities' fear that to arrest him might "spark off an
uprising").
20. BAINTON, REFORMATION, supra note 9, at 147-48.
21. Compare id. at 77-78 (describing Lutherans, Calvinists, and Anabaptists
as the three main types) with SPITZ, supra note 3, at 173-74 (denying that
Anabaptists were "a significant third force in the Reformation," although
conceding their "long-term importance").
22. On the spread of Lutheranism, see BAINTON, REFORMATION, supra note
9, at 141-59. For a succinct introduction to Luther's teachings, see SPITZ, supra
note 3, at 76-88.
23. For the spread of Calvinism, see BAINTON, REFORMATION, supra note 9,
at 160-82. For Calvin's teachings, see SPITZ, supra note 3, at 223-27.
24. On the Anabaptists, see generally BAINTON, REFORMATION, supra note
9, at 95-109; WILLIAM ESTEP, THE ANABAPTIST STORY (rev. ed. 1975); SPITZ,
supra note 3, at 166-74; GEORGE HUNTSTON WILLIAMs, THE RADICAL REFOR-
MATION (1962). For a collection of Anabaptist and other radical writings from
the 1520s, see THE RADICAL REFORMATION (Michael G. Baylor ed., 1991).
25. On Anglicanism as a "middle way" or compromise, see BAINTON,
REFORMATION, supra note 9, at 183-210; SPITZ, supra note 3, at 262-67.
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matic evangelizers offered an attractive alternative, in verna-
cular languages, to a Church that had grown visibly corrupt.2"
But Protestantism also spread for political reasons-it offered
princes a legitimate excuse to repudiate bishops, to eliminate a
competing source of authority in their domain, and to consolidate
their power.17  It spread for economic reasons-local money
would not have to be sent to Rome, and local princes could seize
the lands of monasteries, convents, and bishops.2" It spread for
dynastic and sexual reasons-Henry VIII in England needed a
legitimate male heir, and he wanted to marry his mistress, but
the Pope would not cooperate.29
In the Peace of Augsburg, Catholics and Lutherans reached
an accommodation within the Holy Roman Empire."° Each
ruler in the empire would choose the religion of his realm; all his
subjects would have to conform or emigrate. The historian Will
Durant has written that "Protestantism was nationalism
extended to religion.""' Protestantism was more than that, but
that is surely part of what it was. The same nationalist forces
were at work in countries that remained Catholic, and Catholic
kings established large measures of control over national
26. See BAINTON, REFORMATION, supra note 9, at 12-21 (summarizing the
secularization and corruption of the Church); TODD, REFORMATION, supra note
4, at 244 (arguing that the Reformation was "primarily a religious event,
something which happened because large numbers of men entertained or did
not entertain particular religious beliefs," and that various secular causes were
merely the nonessential occasions for religious change); TUCHMAN, supra note
9, at 51-126 (reviewing the papal follies from 1470 to 1530). On the emotional
appeal of Protestantism, see STEVEN E. OZMENT, THE REFORMATION IN THE
CITIEs 47-120 (1975).
27. See BAINTON, REFORMATION, supra note 9, at 156 (concluding that the
spread of Lutheranism to Scandinavia was primarily motivated by politics);
WILL DURANT, THE REFORMATION 438-41 (1957) (summarizing the political and
economic forces that propelled Protestantism).
28. For accounts of seizures of property, see DURANT, supra note 27, at 439-
40 (seizures of church buildings and land in Germany), 563-78 (seizures of
English monasteries), 625 (seizures of monastic lands in Sweden); G.R. ELTON,
REFORM AND REFORMATION: ENGLAND, 1509-1558, at 230-49 (1977) (detailing
seizure of the English monasteries). Luther's lieutenant, Philip Melanchton,
complained that "[ulnder cover of the Gospel the princes were only intent on the
plunder of the churches." DURANT, supra note 27, at 440.
29. BAINTON, REFORMATION, supra note 9, at 185-91; see also SPITZ, supra
note 3, at 119-20 (reporting that Luther secretly authorized a bigamous
marriage for a Lutheran prince); DURANT, supra note 27, at 449 (telling the
same story with somewhat different emphasis).
30. BAINTON, REFORMATION, supra note 9, at 155; SPITZ, supra note 3, at
122-23.
31. DURANT, supra note 27, at 457.
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churches with significant independence from Rome.32 It is
revealing of the relative importance of religious and secular
loyalties that in 1527 an army of the Catholic Emperor Charles
V sacked Rome, looted the Vatican, and held the Pope for
ransom.
33
The principle of Augsburg, and the de facto rule throughout
Europe, was "cuius regio, eius religio-whose the rule, his the
religion."4 This principle made the State supreme over funda-
mental religious choices, and to the extent it could be enforced,
it required State suppression of minority faiths and made the
population of each state religiously uniform. The logical extreme
of this principle was Erastianism, or state supremacy over the
established Church, 5 and England and some of the Lutheran
states in Germany reached this extreme. 6 But ruler's choice
did not inevitably lead to Erastianism; the State might give
more or less independence to the church that it established.
Calvinists avoided Erastianism; Calvin developed a theory of
church and state as separate and independent entities with
separate responsibilities, and no individual could hold both
religious and political positions.37 But this was hardly sepa-
ration of church and state:8 the State enforced religious unifor-
mity,39 and when the Puritans developed their democratic
version of this model, only members of the established Church
could vote or hold political office.4°
32. See id. at 141-42.
33. SPITZ, supra note 3, at 116; TUCHMIAN, supra note 9, at 121-24.
34. SPrIZ, supra note 3, at 122.
35. See BAINTON, REFORMATION, supra note 9, at 236-38 (outlining the
extent of Erastianism in England). The name comes from the Swiss theologian
Thomas Erastus.
36. See SPITZ, supra note 3, at 362-63 (describing arrangements such as city
council control of local churches in Germany and royal control of the church in
England). For more on England, see infra text accompanying notes 57-60.
37. WILLIAM J. BOUWSMA, JOHN CALVIN: A SIxTEENTH-CENTURY PORTRAIT
204 (1988); SPITZ, supra note 3, at 363; John Witte, Jr., How to Govern a City
on a Hill: The Early Puritan Contribution to American Constitutionalism, 39
EMORY L.J. 41, 55 (1990).
38. See John Witte, Jr., Moderate Religious Liberty in the Theology of John
Calvin, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN WESTERN THOUGHT, supra note * (explaining
that Calvin's approach differed vastly from the modern American idea of
separation of church and state).
39. BOUWSMA, supra note 37, at 211-13; see Witte, supra note 37, at 56
(describing Massachusetts laws requiring Sabbath observance and church
attendance, and forbidding blasphemy and idolatry).
40. Witte, supra note 37, at 59, 62.
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Of course, religious uniformity could not always be enforced.
Success depended on the number of religious dissenters, the
strength of the government, the relative determination of
government and dissenters, and the ease or difficulty of emi-
gration. German states remained religiously uniform into the
nineteenth century,41 perhaps because emigration to another
German state was relatively easy. In France, the Edict of
Nantes proclaimed toleration for Calvinists in 1598, ending a
generation of civil war, executions, and reciprocal assassinations
in the failed pursuit of uniformity.42 But in 1685 Louis XIV
revoked the Edict and actively persecuted Protestants, driving
many of them out of France and many more into real or feigned
conversions.43 Political and religious developments fueled a
demand for persecution at that time; the increased power of the
central government made it possible.
In Spain and Italy, reform movements flourished briefly
before the Inquisitions vigorously and effectively suppressed
them." But neither the Inquisition nor thousands of death
sentences from the Duke of Alba's irregular secular tribunal
could stop reform in the Low Countries, where Calvinism and
Dutch nationalism united in resistance to Catholicism and
Spanish rule.4" The ultimate solution in the Low Countries
was territorial division, the creation of what is now the Nether-
lands (Protestant) and Belgium (Catholic)."
In Germany, the Peace of Augsburg lasted more or less from
1555 to 1618, finally collapsing at the outbreak of the Thirty
Years War.47 The war began with a wonderfully named
incident, the Defenestration of Prague (from "fenestra," meaning
41. See SPITZ, supra note 3, at 122.
42. For a summary of incidents preceding the Edict, see BAINTON,
REFORMATION, supra note 9, at 162-72. On the French experience to the mid-
1550s, see SPITZ, supra note 3, at 192-203.
43. BAINTON, REFORMATION, supra note 9, at 172; ANDREW LOSSKEY, LOUIS
XIV AND THE FRENCH MONARCHY 217-28 (1994) (describing the persecution of
French Protestants).
44. See BAINTON, REFORMATION, supra note 9, at 131-40; PETERS, supra
note 14, at 95, 107, 110-11; SPITZ, supra note 3, at 233-35.
45. See WILLIAM S. MALTBY, ALBA: A BIOGRAPHY OF FERNANDO ALVAREZ DE
TOLEDO, THIRD DUKE OF ALBA, 1507-1582, at 153-58 (1983) (concluding that the
Council of Troubles condemned nearly 9000 to death, but executed only 1083,
the rest having fled the country).
46. BAINTON, REFORMATION, supra note 9, at 173-78.
47. See id. at 155 (explaining the principles and ambiguities of the Peace
of Augsburg and the reasons for its end).
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"window"4"), the throwing-out-the-window of Prague.4 9 Local
representatives threw two emissaries of the Emperor out a
second story window; with religious and political tensions
already high, that act sparked a war that lasted thirty years and
eventually involved most of Europe. In general, subject to the
conflicting political interests of each ruler, the war pitted
Catholic states against Protestant states." But the decisive
intervention came when Catholic France allied with Protestant
Sweden against the Catholic Emperor, thereby fatally weakening
France's traditional enemy Spain, and illustrating once again
that the needs of the State were more important than the needs
of the Church.5'
B. ENGLAND
Of course to the American Founders, the English experience
was most salient, and I want to review that experience in
greater detail. An exhaustive French history of the Reformation
concludes a nation-by-nation account with the statement that,
"[a]mong all the countries that were divided by the Refor-
mation,... England comes in last so far as tolerance is con-
cerned."52 It is far beyond the scope of my research to accept
or reject this claim, but certainly it is plausible. Another fact
seems relatively clear: the State dominated the Reformation in
England to a greater extent than anywhere else in Europe.
Causation is speculative, but it seems reasonable to believe that
the State's dominance at least contributed to the duration and
severity of religious conflict in England.
Henry VIII authored a pamphlet refuting Luther, and in
1521, the Pope rewarded him with the title Defender of the
Faith.5" Elizabeth II claims that title still. But by the later
1520s, Henry was in an escalating feud with the Catholic
Church over the Pope's refusal to annul his marriage to Cather-
48. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 670 (compact ed. 1971).
49. GEOFFREY PARKER, THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR 48-49 (1984).
50. Id. at 82.
51. See id. at 148-61. For a table showing the participation of 17 European
states, and the side or sides they fought on from time to time, see id. at 155.
52. JOSEPH LECLER, TOLERATION AND THE REFORMATION 493 (1960). The
formulation seems designed to exclude those countries where the Reformation
never became a substantial force, such as Spain and Italy.
53. BAINTON, REFORMATION, supra note 9, at 192; SPITZ, supra note 3, at
246.
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ine of Aragon.54 That marriage had produced no son who
survived infancy, Catherine was at the limits of child-bearing
age, and Henry had long since abandoned her bed.55 The Pope
would likely have bent doctrine to accommodate Henry and save
England for the Church, but for the inconvenient fact that
Catherine was the aunt of Charles V-Emperor and King of
Spain, with the military power to sack Rome-and Charles
loomed much larger than Henry in the Pope's political calcu-
lations.56
By a series of statutes in the 1530s, Parliament gave Henry
sole power to appoint bishops, 57 enacted that Henry was
sovereign over Church and State in England," required all
bishops to swear oaths acknowledging his supremacy,59 and
gave civil commissioners jurisdiction over heresy trials.6' Royal
advisers and popular pamphleteers contended to push Henry and
England toward or away from genuine Protestantism. 6' The
Protestants made some progress, but Henry's theology remained
predominantly Catholic except for papal supremacy.62 His
break with Rome was not based on religious differences; he
persecuted those who challenged his takeover of the Church or
the validity of his second marriage and also those who chal-
54. BAINTON, REFORMATION, supra note 9, at 185-91.
55. Id. at 186; ANTONiA FRASER, THE SIX WIVES OF KING HENRY VIII 92-93,
151-52 (1992). On the strongly felt need for a son and not just daughters, see
ELTON, supra note 28, at 104-05, 178-79; MAcKIE, supra note 14, at 325.
56. BAINTON, REFORMATION, supra note 9, at 187-88; ELTON, supra note 28,
at 107; TUCHMAN, supra note 9, at 120.
57. Ecclesiastical Appointments Act (The Absolute Restraint of Annates,
Election of Bishops, and Letters Missive Act), 1534, 25 Hen. 8, ch. 20 (Eng.),
reprinted in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF ENGLISH CHURCH HISTORY 201, 204-
06 (Henry Gee & William J. Hardy eds., 1896) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS
ILLUSTRATIVE].
58. Supremacy Act, 1534, 26 Hen. 8, ch.1 (Eng.), reprinted in DOCUMENTS
ILLUSTRATIVE, supra note 57, at 243, 243-44.
59. Ecclesiastical Appointments Act, 1534, 25 Hen. 8, ch. 20 (Eng.),
reprinted in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE, supra note 57, at 207.
60. Six Articles Act, 1539,31 Hen. 8, ch. 14 (Eng.), reprinted in DOCUMENTS
ILLUSTRATIVE, supra note 57, at 303,307-14. For summaries of this and related
statutes, see MACKIE, supra note 14, at 349-60.
61. For a summary, see SPITZ, supra note 3, at 236-49, 262-67. For a
detailed account of every ebb and flow of the Protestant tide, see generally
ELTON, supra note 28.
62. See Six Articles Act, 1539, 31 Hen. 8, ch. 14 (Eng.), reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE, supra note 57, at 303 (giving firmly Catholic
answers to six disputed questions of faith, and declaring contrary answers
heretical). For an analysis of the answers, see ELTON, supra note 28, at 287-88.
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lenged Catholic doctrine on other grounds.63 Many victims
were executed, Thomas More the most famous among them."
The Pope proclaimed Henry a heretic, placed England under
interdict, released all English subjects from their allegiance to
the Crown, and commanded them and all Christian princes to
depose Henry.65 It had little effect; power was in the State and
not in the Church. Catholic sovereigns on the continent refused
to let the Church promulgate the interdict in their realms.66
The claimed power of Popes to interfere with kings was a
dangerous doctrine indeed, and Catholic kings would not
publicize it to their subjects.
Henry had quickly and successfully established the Erastian
model in England; State dominance in religious matters was
thereafter widely assumed. But religious battles for control of
the State were just beginning. Few on either side had yet
grasped the idea of tolerance.67 Equally important, if the State
controls religion, then religions must fight for control of the
State. Protestant-Catholic conflict was a major part of English
politics for two hundred years, and even today, economic and
political conflict in Northern Ireland largely follows Protestant-
Catholic lines.6"
Under Henry's son, Edward VI, and Thomas Cranmer as
Archbishop of Canterbury, the Church of England became more
theologically Protestant.69 Cranmer promulgated the Book of
Common Prayer, and the Acts of Uniformity required all persons
63. BAINTON, REFORMATION, supra note 9, at 198-99.
64. See ELTON, supra note 28, at 128-29, 180-81, 191-94, 293 (recounting
executions of both leaders and followers from both the Protestant and the
Catholic factions); MACKIE, supra note 14, at 361-63 (describing the executions
of Sir Thomas More, Cardinal Fisher, a charismatic woman who prophesied the
King's death if he divorced Catherine, and the followers of this woman).
65. DURANT, supra note 27, at 558.
66. Id.
67. For the exceptions, see HENRY KAMEN, THE RISE OF TOLERATION (1967)
(recounting the history of this period with emphasis on those individuals and
groups who urged toleration).
68. See generally J. BOWYER BELL, THE IRISH TROUBLES: A GENERATION OF
VIOLENCE 1967-1992, at 1-57 (1993) (surveying the social divisions in Northern
Ireland on the eve of the current "Troubles"); BRENDAN O'LEARY & JOHN
McGARRY, THE POLITICS OF ANTAGONISM: UNDERSTANDING NORTHERN IRELAND
54-180 (1993) (tracing the religious and ethnic basis for the conflict from British
colonization in the seventeenth century to the renewed violence following the
breakdown of British hegemony in the 1960s).
69. See BAINTON, REFORMATION, supra note 9, at 199-203; MACKIE, supra
note 14, at 507-22; TODD, REFORMATION, supra note 4, at 329-37.
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to worship at services conducted in that form and no other. °
Only two heretics were burned in Edward's reign, but many
Catholics were imprisoned, and priests who adhered to the old
forms or doctrines were removed from office.7 '
Edward died in 1553 at the age of fifteen.72 His regents
attempted to crown Henry's Protestant great niece, Lady Jane
Grey,7 ' but Parliament, the people, and a large majority of
those with troops to command rallied round Edward's half-sister
Mary Tudor, Catherine's daughter, a Catholic and the rightful
heir.74 She initially proclaimed toleration,75 but within a year,
she had forbidden the Protestant worship service76 and ordered
the suppression of heresy.7 After her plans to marry Philip of
Spain provoked an unsuccessful insurrection, 8 or perhaps
merely as soon as she had the means at hand,79 she became a
far more vigorous persecutor than Henry ever had been; she is
remembered as Bloody Mary." Some three hundred Protes-
tants were executed in her five years on the throne, including
70. First Edwardine Act of Uniformity, 1549, 2 & 3 Edw. 6, ch. 1 (Eng.),
reprinted in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE, supra note 57, at 358; Second
Edwardine Act of Uniformity, 1552, 5 & 6 Ed. 6, ch. 1 (Eng.), reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE, supra note 57, at 369.
71. DURANT, supra note 27, at 585.
72. MACKIE, supra note 14, at 526.
73. For a full account, see generally MARY LUKE, THE NINE DAYS QUEEN:
A PORTRAIT OF LADY JANE GREY (1986).
74. See MACKIE, supra note 14, at 526-30 (describing Mary's ascension to
the throne). For an account of Mary's reign, see generally D.M. LOADES, THE
REIGN OF MARY TUDOR: POLITICS, GOVERNMENT, AND RELIGION IN ENGLAND,
1553-1558 (1979).
75. See Queen Mary's First Proclamation About Religion, 1553, reprinted
in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE, supra note 57, at 373, 373-74 (proclaiming that,
though she would prefer all of her subjects to be Catholic, she would not compel
them to be so at this time).
76. Mary's First Act of Repeal, 1553, 1 Mary, stat. 2, ch. 2 (Eng.), reprinted
in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE, supra note 57, at 377, 379 (forbidding any form
of worship service other than that "most commonly used, ministered, and
frequented in the said last year of the reign of the said late King Henry VIII").
77. Injunctions of Queen Mary, 1554, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRA-
TIVE, supra note 57, at 380, 381.
78. MACKIE, supra note 14, at 536-40. The causal connection is asserted in
DURANT, supra note 27, at 593.
79. See MACKIE, supra note 14, at 540-42, 549 ("[Flrom the very first she
took it to be her duty to restore England to the bosom of Rome."); see also
ELTON, supra note 28, at 383 ("Mary's desire to do away at once with the
abominations of heresy and schism had to bow before the legal and political
difficulties.").
80. DURANT, supra note 27, at 600.
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Cranmer and the other Protestant leaders.8' But the persecu-
tions appear to have alienated far more people than they
intimidated.82
Mary was succeeded in 1558 by her half-sister Elizabeth, a
Protestant." Elizabeth's first Parliament reinstated the Book
of Common Prayer and the Act of Uniformity.84 Failure to
attend the Anglican worship was punishable by fine, attendance
at the Catholic Mass by fine and imprisonment.85 Any person
who converted to Catholicism committed a capital offense, as did
any Catholic priest who remained in England.86 Enforcement
waxed and waned with political circumstance through
Elizabeth's reign and through most of the next century. 7 For
their part, Catholics produced a large body of teaching about
how far one could feign Protestantism without committing
sin.88
81. See BAINTON, REFORMATION, supra note 9, at 204-06 (reporting 288
burnings and numerous Protestant deaths in prison during Mary's reign);
ELTON, supra note 28, at 382-89 (describing the "exceptionally bloody"
persecution under Mary); MACKIE, supra note 14, at 549-53 (reviewing the
persecution with special attention to the more famous martyrs); SPITZ, supra
note 3, at 275-76 (emphasizing Cranmer's martyrdom). For the classic account,
see generally JOHN FOXE, FOXE's BOOK OF MARTYRS (G.A. Williamson ed., 1965)
(originally published in 1563 as ACTS AND MONUMENTS OF MAITrERS MOST
SPECIAL AND MEMORABLE HAPPENING IN THE CHURCH, ESPECIALLY IN THE
REALM OF ENGLAND).
82. See ELTON, supra note 28, at 387-89 (describing the persecutions as a
"monumentally disastrous mistake"); LOADES, supra note 74, at 333-34 ("[Tlhe
persecutions failed, and could be seen by contemporaries to be failing.");
MACKIE, supra note 14, at 560 ("Mary left... people disgusted with the faith
that had kindled the fires of Smithfield.").
83. BAINTON, REFORMATION, supra note 9, at 206. For an account of
Elizabeth's reign, see generally J.B. BLACK, THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH 1558-1603
(2d ed. 1959).
84. Act of Uniformity, 1559, 1 Eliz., ch. 2 (Eng.), reprinted in DOCUMENTS
ILLUSTRATIVE, supra note 57, at 458.
85. BLACK, supra note 83, at 184.
86. See Act Against Jesuits and Seminarists, 1585, 27 Eliz., ch. 2 (Eng.),
reprinted in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE, supra note 57, at 485 (ordering all
priests to leave England within 40 days of the Act's proclamation); see also
BLACK, supra note 83, at 185 (detailing the severe sanctions against Catholic
priests during Elizabeth's reign).
87. See BLACK, supra note 83, at 185-86 (summarizing the scope and
motives of anti-Catholic persecution by Elizabeth's government); GODFREY
DAvIES, THE EARLY STUARTS 1603-1660, at 204-14 (2d ed. 1959) (describing
"fitful" and "intermittent" enforcement of anti-Catholic laws under James I,
Charles I, and Cromwell, with fewer than 60 executions in 57 years).
88. See ROBERT E. RODES, LAW AND MODERNIZATION IN THE CHURCH OF
ENGLAND: CHARLES 11 TO THE WELFARE STATE 81-85 (1991) (summarizing these
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Elizabeth never married. For the first thirty years of her
reign, the heir to the throne was her cousin Mary Stuart, Mary
Queen of Scots.89 This Mary too was Catholic, the youthful
widow of a King of France, and Queen in her own right of
Protestant Scotland; she abdicated her throne and fled to
England in 1568, throwing herself on Elizabeth's mercy."
Elizabeth held Mary as a prisoner, under gentle conditions in
country estates, unwilling to kill her and afraid to set her
free.9 Mary's continued life was a threat to Elizabeth's,
because the assassination of Elizabeth would restore a Catholic
to the throne, and any Catholic in Europe might be tempted to
act on that knowledge.92 Finally, in 1587, Elizabeth had Mary
executed for treason, on charges of plotting against the life of the
Queen." Now the heir to the throne was Mary's son James,
who had been separated from his mother in infancy and raised
as a Scots Calvinist.94
Philip II, King of Spain and widower of Mary Tudor,
responded to Mary Stuart's execution by finally launching the
Spanish Armada.95 If England could not be restored to the
Church by succession, it must be restored by force-besides,
England was a rich prize, and Philip would have the King of
France surrounded.9" But bad weather and English sailing
skill destroyed the Armada." It is revealing that many English
casuistry books).
89. GARRETT MATTINGLY, THE ARMADA 6 (1959).
90. See BAINTON, REFORMATION, supra note 9, at 181-82 (discussing the
Protestant opposition to Mary in Scotland); BLACK, supra note 83, at 108-10
(noting Elizabeth's support of Mary's right to the Scottish throne); WILL DURANT
& ARIEL DURANT, THE AGE OF REASON BEGINS 110-24 (1961) (reviewing Mary's
arrival, reign, and flight from Scotland).
91. See BLACK, supra note 83, at 110, 374-75 (discussing the reasons for and
conditions of Mary's imprisonment).
92. See id. at 376-77 (noting that the Pope had authorized assassination of
heretic rulers); MATTINGLY, supra note 89, at 6-7 (noting public demand for
Mary's death).
93. See BLACK, supra note 83, at 379-87 (reviewing the "overwhelming,
irrefutable" evidence of Mary's guilt); MATTINGLY, supra note 89, at 1-5 (telling
the story of Mary's execution).
94. BLACK, supra note 83, at 389.
95. See MATTINGLY, supra note 89, at 69,80-81 (noting that news of Mary's
death reached Philip on March 23, 1587, and that a flurry of orders and
correspondence for the Armada was issued on March 31).
96. On Philip's mixed motives, see BLACK, supra note 83, at 389-91;
MATTINGLY, supra note 89, at 81.
97. The best account is MATTINGLY, supra note 89, and a summary can be
found in BLACK, supra note 83, at 389-405.
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Catholics fought valiantly for their Protestant Queen, despite
her suppression of their worship.9 They might have preferred
an English Catholic on the throne, and a Catholic majority in
Parliament, but they were Englishmen, with no desire for a
Spanish conquest.
By the time of Elizabeth's death in 1603, England was
irretrievably Protestant, and most Catholics accepted the fact.99
But some on both sides continued to believe that to control the
religion of the Crown would be to control the religion of the
country, and the Catholic population contained extremists who
had not given up. In 1605, five Catholics dug a tunnel and
placed thirty tons of gunpowder under the Houses of Parliament,
planning to blow it up on opening day, when the King and all his
ministers would be in attendance.' The plot was revealed
and the plotters were executed. The plotter actually found in
the chamber with the gunpowder was Guy Fawkes, and England
still celebrates Guy Fawkes Day on November 5.1°1
But the Catholics were no longer the most serious threat to
Anglican dominance. There were also the Puritans, English
Calvinists who viewed the Church of England as far too Catholic.
They too rejected the Uniformity Acts and the Book of Common
Prayer. In 1593, Parliament enacted two parallel statutes, the
Act Against Puritans0 2 and the Act Against Recusants...
(the term for Catholics who refused to attend the Anglican
98. BLACK, supra note 83, at 389.
99. See id. at 451-57 (reviewing the growth among Catholic priests of a
movement to make some accommodation with the government); CHRISTOPHER
HILL, GOD'S ENGLISHMAN: OLIVER CROMWELL AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 14-
15 (1970) (arguing that the security of Protestant dominance was prerequisite
to the intra-Protestant conflict of the next century).
100. See DAVIES, supra note 87, at 8; TRIAL OF Guy FAwKES AND OTHERS
(Donald Carswell ed., 1934) [hereinafter TRIAL] (reprinting the extant records
of the trial of the conspirators, with an introduction that summarizes the known
and disputed facts).
101. Guy Fawkes, in ACADEMIC AMERICAN ENCYCLOPEDIA (Grolier Electronic
Publishing 1991). My English friends assure me that the holiday has lost any
serious content; it has become the equivalent of Halloween. TRIAL, supra note
100, at 1. That is not the case with annual commemorations of the Battle of the
Boyne, a 1690 battle between Protestant and Catholic armies in Ireland. See
GEORGE CLARK, THE LATER STUARTS 1660-1714, at 306-08 (2d ed. 1965)
(discussing the battle). The Battle of the Boyne is still enthusiastically
celebrated in Northern Ireland. BELL, supra note 68, at 50-51.
102. Act Against Puritans, 1593, 35 Eliz., ch. 1 (Eng.), reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE, supra note 57, at 492.
103. Act Against Recusants, 1593, 35 Eliz., ch. 2, reprinted in DOCUMENTS
ILLUSTRATIVE, supra note 57, at 498.
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service). Throughout the reigns of James I and Charles I, intra-
Protestant conflict steadily escalated, culminating in civil
war.
10 4
The English Civil War of the 1640s was partly political and
economic, partly religious. It was for the rights of Parliament
and the middle class against Stuart absolutism and the heredi-
tary aristocracy, but it was also Puritans against Anglicans,
Catholics, and Scots Presbyterians. The religious causes were
inextricably linked with the others'0 5 arguably the religious
causes dominated.' °6 One of the royalist slogans was "No
bishop, no king," the point being that Puritan demands for
abolition of bishops would lead in time to abolition of the
monarchy as well.' 7 Charles I was married to a Catholic
daughter of the King of France, because pursuit of strategic
alliances through royal intermarriage had outweighed religious
considerations for his Protestant father. But a Catholic Queen
rendered the royal family suspect just as the high-church
Anglicans were retreating from some Calvinist doctrines,
especially predestination. Puritans accused the royal family and
the leading bishops of reintroducing "popery."'O' And in the
end, when the victorious Puritans attempted to negotiate a
settlement with their captured King, it was the religious issues
that could not be resolved. 0 9
Charles I lost his head,"0 and Oliver Cromwell ruled
104. See generally ROBERT ASHTON, THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR: CONSERVATISM
AND REVOLUTION 1603-1649 (2d ed. 1989) (assessing the Civil War and its
causes); DAVIES, supra note 87, at 1-159 (tracing English history from the
accession of James I to the execution of Charles I).
105. See generally HILL, supra note 99, at 13-34 (summarizing the 40 years
prior to the Civil War).
106. See John Morrill, The Religious Context of the English Civil War, 34
ROYAL HIST. SoclY TRANS. (5th Series) 155, 178 (1984) ("The English Civil War
was not the first European Revolution; it was the last of the Wars of Religion.");
see also ASHTON, supra note 104, at 98-99 (accepting Morrill's conclusion).
107. THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN
AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2 (1986); DAVIES, supra
note 87, at 70-71.
108. See DAVIES, supra note 87, at 57-60, 68-74 ("[Mlost Englishmen
continued to believe that the restoration of popery was an ever present threat.");
HILL, supra note 99, at 26-27, 32 (noting Charles's unwillingness to intervene
in the Thirty Years War, and the Catholicizing influence of Archbishop Laud,
Queen Henrietta, and other Catholics at court).
109. ASHTON, supra note 104, at 337-39.
110. Id. at 3; DAVIES, supra note 87, at 156-59.
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England for a decade."' Under Cromwell the Puritan worship
service was established, but the laws requiring attendance were
repealed, and at least in England the Puritans made only limited
efforts to enforce the prohibitions on Catholic and Anglican
services.' But they vigorously enforced their Sabbath laws
and other moral legislation, alienating the populace in the at-
tempt."3 Catholics fared much worse in Ireland, where Crom-
well slaughtered priests and massacred the inhabitants of two
cities in his vicious reconquest."4  One of his biographers
attributes the different treatment of English and Irish Catholics
to the fact that Catholicism no longer seemed a political threat
in England, but that it was obviously associated with political
rebellion in Ireland." 5
The Puritan victory was only a military victory by a highly
motivated minority, and England never became Puritan."'
Charles II was restored to the throne shortly after Cromwell's
death, after some military maneuvering but without bloodshed,
and to general popular acclaim."7 Charles entered into a
secret treaty with Louis XIV, promising to announce his own
Catholicism and "reconcile himself with the Church of Rome as
soon as the welfare of the kingdom would permit," in exchange
for cash payments from France."' This Charles, son of
Charles I and his Catholic wife, may have been a secret Catho-
lic;... more important, he desperately needed the money."o
But he never performed his end of the bargain, perhaps rightlyjudging that the welfare of the kingdom would not permit it.
111. See generally DAVIES, supra note 87, at 160-236.
112. Id. at 198-204, 210-13; see HILL, supra note 99, at 121.
113. See DAVIES, supra note 87, at 304-15 (stating that the measures
"imposed a yoke heavier than most Englishmen would bear").
114. DAVIES, supra note 87, at 161-63; HILL, supra note 99, at 116-17, 121-
22.
115. HILL, supra note 99, at 121-22.
116. DAVIES, supra note 87, at 314.
117. Id. at 251-60.
118. See CLARK,, supra note 101, at 76 (summarizing the treaty of Dover);
ANTONIA FRASER, ROYAL CHARLES: CHARLES II AND THE RESTORATION 275-76
(1979) (quoting the treaty).
119. A biographer concludes that any conversion happened late in life,
perhaps on his deathbed, FRASER, supra note 118, at 149-152, 451-55, although
some of her evidence is consistent with the view that Charles's need for secrecy
precluded any overt Catholic practice, even in private. What he believed and
when he believed it cannot be known.
120. See CLARK, supra note 101, at 76 (noting "the perpetual inadequacy of
parliamentary grants").
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Parliament and not the King was making religious policy,
and Parliament restricted religious liberty in this reign.
Quakers were imprisoned in large numbers for violating new
restrictions on nonconforming worship services, and the Test Act
of 1672 barred from public office all but Anglicans.' 2 '
The most bizarre outbreak of persecution was in response to
the so-called Popish Plot.122 The real plot originated with two
informants who made wholly fictitious allegations of a Catholic
plot to assassinate the King. There is ample evidence that the
King himself did not believe the charges, and the principal
accuser was later convicted of perjury after public opinion
subsided. But in the meantime, some thirty-five Catholics were
executed for treason and similar crimes. The incident is
noteworthy for its use of wholly neutral and secular laws to
accomplish a religious persecution.
When Charles II died in 1685, the crown passed to his
brother James. James was openly Catholic, i" but the Protes-
tant Parliament acquiesced in his ascension to the throne.
England had just been through civil war and regicide; few were
eager to repeat the experience. James's daughter Mary was a
Protestant married to another Protestant, William of Orange;
124
one Catholic reign could be endured.
James appointed Catholics to high office, raised a royal
army with mostly Catholic officers, supported Catholic bishops
with royal ftnds, permitted the founding of new Catholic
institutions, and proclaimed toleration by royal decree.125 His
Declaration of Indulgence purported to authorize public worship
for all sects and to abolish all test oaths and religious penal-
ties. 25 But this was suspect in its motives (was he really for
tolerance, or only for Catholicism?) and unpopular in its
policy-Protestants were not ready for tolerance. 21 Perhaps
121. Id. at 17-27, 80.
122. See id. at 93-95.
123. Id. at 117.
124. Lois G. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1689, at 108 (1981);
see CLARK, supra note 101, at 126-27. William was nephew and son-in-law to
James H, first cousin and husband to Mary. For the Stuart family tree, see
FRASER, supra note 118, at 6-7.
125. CLARK, supra note 101, at 121-25.
126. The Declaration of Indulgence, 1687, Patent Roll, 3 James 2, pt. 3, No.
18, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE, supra note 57, at 641.
127. See CLARK, supra note 101, at 117 ("The attempts of Charles II to bring
in general toleration had shown that nothing was more likely to divide the
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most important, the Declaration asserted an unacceptable claim
of royal prerogative to override Acts of Parliament.'8 James
prosecuted seven Anglican bishops for refusing to order the
Declaration of Indulgence read in the churches, and a jury
acquitted.'29 By now, King and country were wholly at odds.
The last straw came in 1688, when the Queen gave birth to a
son who would be raised as a Catholic and would take the crown
ahead of Mary.30
Leading Englishmen invited William to invade England, and
William's army drove James from the throne without a battle.'1
3
William and Mary were crowned jointly, with William exercising
the powers of the office; the winners called it the Glorious
Revolution. Parliament enacted a Bill of Rights,'32 which set
out a range of civil liberties and parliamentary rights and also
provided that no Catholic and no one married to a Catholic could
ever inherit the throne of England.33 Liberty and anti-Cathol-
icism were thus inextricably linked.
The same Parliament enacted full toleration for all Protes-
tants, redeeming a promise to the Protestant dissenters that if
they spurned James's Declaration of Indulgence, they would be
granted toleration when James was gone.' But the Act
specifically excluded "any papist or popish recusant whatsoever,
or any person that shall deny in his preaching or writing the
doctrine of the blessed Trinity."35 The exclusion of those who
denied the Trinity was aimed at Unitarians"' and was not
enforced against the Jews. Cromwell had readmitted the Jews
nation."); WILL DURANT & ARIEL DURANT, THE AGE OF LOuIS XIV 291-92 (1963)
(summarizing a successful Protestant pamphlet that argued that there could be
no lasting toleration from a Catholic king).
128. See DURANT & DURANT, supra note 127, at 291-93.
129. Id. at 291-94.
130. CLARK, supra note 101, at 126-27; SCHWOERER, supra note 124, at 109.
131. See CLARK, supra note 101, at 133-43 (summarizing the revolution);
STUART E. PRALL, THE BLOODLESS REVOLUTION: ENGLAND 1688, at 89-242
(1972) (describing the reign and overthrow of James II).
132. Bill of Rights, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE, supra note 57, at
645.
133. Id. at 652-53. See generally SCHWOERER, supra note 124 (discussing the
development and passage of the Declaration of Rights and the Bill of Rights).
134. PRALL, supra note 131, at 147, 154.
135. The Toleration Act, 1689, 1 Win. & Mary ch. 18, reprinted in Docu-
MENTS ILLUSTRATIVE, supra note 57, at 654, 663.
136. See KAMEN, supra note 67, at 211 (noting that "the penal laws were
held to be in force, particularly against Catholics and Unitarians").
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to England,' 7 and there have been synagogues in London
continuously since 1662.138
By 1700, it appeared that the Protestant branch of the
Stuart line would die without heirs and that the Catholic branch
would again succeed to the throne. Parliament anticipated the
impending crisis with the Act of Settlement, naming a German
granddaughter of James I, and her Protestant heirs, as the next
heirs to the throne of England.139 Thus did England acquire
George I, Elector of Hanover and King of England, a German
who rarely spoke English. 4 ° Better that than a Catholic.
In 1745, the Stuart pretender Bonnie Prince Charlie landed
in Scotland and raised the clans to invade England and claim his
throne.' 4 ' This doomed venture was a mix of Catholicism,
Scots nationalism, and personal ambition for the throne. The
last Catholic claimant to the throne of England was defeated,
and his army slaughtered on the field at Culloden Moor,'42
215 years after Henry's break with Rome, and within the living
memory of the American Founders.
C. THE UNITED STATES
The story of religious conflict in the American colonies, and
the emergence of constitutional guarantees of religious liberty,
is much better known in the American legal literature,113 and
there is little need to rehearse it here. Suffice it to say that the
American colonies repeated European mistakes on a smaller
scale. There were established churches in New England and the
southern colonies.'" In New England, religious dissidents
137. DAVIES, supra note 87, at 214.
138. CLARK, supra note 101, at 36.
139. Act of Settlement, 1700, 12 & 13 William 3, ch. 2 (Eng.), reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE, supra note 57, at 664, 666-67.
140. See RAGNHILD HATTON, GEORGE I: ELECTOR AND KING 129-31 (1978).
141. For a full account, see generally DAVID DAICHES, CHARLES EDWARD
STUART: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF BONNIE PRINCE CHARLIE (1973).
142. Id. at 193-219.
143. See, e.g., CURRY, supra note 107; LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISH-
MENT CLAUSE (1986); Douglas Laycock, Woncoercive" Support for Religion:
Another False Claim About the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U.L. Rev. 37
(1991) [hereinafter Laycock, Noncoercion]; Douglas Laycock, Wonpreferential"
Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV.
875 (1986); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding
of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990) [hereinafter
McConnell, Origins].
144. See CURRY, supra note 107, at 105-07.
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such as Roger Williams were expelled. Those who returned,
such as Quaker missionaries, were occasionally executed.145
As late as the 1770s, Virginia imprisoned Baptist preachers for
preaching without a license."' In both New England and the
south, religious minorities were taxed to support the established
Church.1
47
America also inherited England's fear of Catholicism.
Colonists took the occasion of the Glorious Revolution to
overthrow royal governors in New England and New York, and
Lord Baltimore's Catholic government in Maryland, alleging as
part of the justification in each case a fantastic international plot
to Catholicize the continent." In 1746, when the news of
Culloden Moor reached America, the famous Methodist evange-
list George Whitefield preached a sermon of thanksgiving for
God's delivering Britain and her colonies from the "abominations
of the whore of Babylon."'49 The Declaration of Independence
cites the Quebec Act as one of England's dangerous assaults on
American liberties; 50 what the Act had done was to protect
Catholicism in a conquered Catholic province.' John Jay
unsuccessfully proposed to banish Catholics from New York.'52
When Catholics did arrive in large numbers, in the mid-nine-
teenth century, serious religious conflict ensued. The Protestant
Bible controversy led to mob violence and church burnings,'53
145. Id. at 19.
146. See id. at 102, 135.
147. Id. at 105-07.
148. See DAVID S. LOVEJOY, THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 235-88
(1972).
149. George Whitefield, Sermon V-: Britain's Mercies, and Britain's Duty, in
GEORGE WHITEFIELD, SERMONS ON IMPORTANT SUBJECTS 87, 91 (1832).
150. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 22 (U.S. 1776) ("... For
abolishing the free System of English Laws in a Neighboring Province,
establishing therein an arbitrary Government, and enlarging its Boundaries, so
as to render it at once an Example and fit Instrument for introducing the same
absolute Rule into these Colonies.... ."); see also CURRY, supra note 107, at 133
(noting that American colonists "reacted to the Quebec Act with frenzied
accusations that it imposed tyranny and an establishment of Catholicism and
endangered the entire continent).
151. An Act for Making More Effectual Provision for the Government of the
Province of Quebec in North America, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, ch. 83, § 5 (Eng.),
reprinted in 30 PICKERING'S STATUTES 549, 551 (1773) (providing that Quebec
citizens may enjoy the "free exercise of religion" of the church of Rome subject
to the King's supremacy).
152. CURRY, supra note 107, at 162.
153. For a highly condensed account of the Protestant Bible controversy,
which collects multiple historical sources, see Laycock, Noncoercion, supra note
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a wave of state constitutional amendments forbidding the grant
of public funds to sectarian schools, 15 4 and a failed attempt to
amend the federal Constitution.'55 Anti-Catholic bigotry was
pervasive for much of American history;56 an equally vigorous
anti-Protestantism was at the core of Catholic teaching.
57
As late as 1960, John Kennedy's Catholicism was still a
serious issue in a Presidential election, but that election also
seemed to put the issue to rest.'5 5 Kennedy successfully
addressed the religious issue in a speech to the Greater Houston
Ministerial Association, a speech that was filmed and shown
repeatedly throughout the campaign 5 9 Kennedy won the
election, even though twenty-five percent of Americans had said
in a 1958 poll that they opposed a Catholic nominee for Presi-
dent. 6 ° Kennedy got fewer Protestant votes than a Democrat
should have expected, but more Catholic votes; 16' the net effect
was to prove that a Catholic was electable. By 1987, the
percentage saying they opposed a Catholic nominee for President
143, at 50-52.
154. For a list of these amendments, see CARL ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN CHURCH
LAW §§ 65-66, at 78-80 (2d ed. 1933).
155. See ANSON P. STOKES, 2 CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 68-
69 (1950) (quoting the Blaine Amendment, which would have codified the
Protestant position by authorizing Bible reading in public schools but forbidding
public funding of sectarian schools).
156. See, e.g., DAVID H. BENNETT, THE PARTY OF FEAR: FROM NATIVIST
MOVEMENTS TO THE NEW RIGHT IN AMERICAN HISTORYpassim (1988) (providing
a detailed index entry for "anti-Catholicism"); Barbara Welter, From Maria
Monk to Paul Blanshard: A Century of Protestant Anti-Catholicism, in UNCIVIL
RELIGION: INTERRELIGIOUs HOSTILITY IN AMERICA 43 (Robert N. Bellah &
Frederick E. Greenspahn eds., 1987) [hereinafter UNCIVIL RELIGION].
157. See Jay P. Dolan, Catholic Attitudes Toward Protestants, in UNCIVIL
RELIGION, supra note 156, at 72 ("IT]he very definition of Catholicism included
rejection of Protestantism as an erroneous and thus inferior religion.").
158. See Mark A. Noll, The Eclipse of Old Hostilities Between and the
Potential for New Strife Among Catholics and Protestants Since Vatican II, in
UNCIVIL RELIGION, supra note 156, at 86, 88.
159. THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1960, at 259-61,
391-93 (1961) (describing the speech and reprinting the text). The speech is
still a powerful statement on behalf of religious liberty and against religious
tests for public office. Whether out of conviction or expediency, he committed
himself to the "absolute" separation of church and state, to an absolute ban on
government funds for religious institutions, and to restrictions on political
statements by clergy. Id. at 391. Debate whether religious liberty entails these
positions of course provokes very different divisions today than it did in 1960.
160. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS 40 (1991).
161. PAUL LOPATTO, RELIGION AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 54-59
(1985).
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was down to eight percent.'62
Soon after the Kennedy election came the Second Vatican
Council, an even bigger turning point in Protestant-Catholic
relations. The Council attributed the Reformation and the other
great schisms of history to sin on both sides,'63 accepted non-
Catholics as fellow Christians with a relationship to the Church
and the prospect of salvation,16 and "exhort[ed] all the Catho-
lic faithful to ... participate skillfully in the work of ecume-
nism." 65  Anti-Protestantism largely disappeared from
Catholic rhetoric; anti-Catholicism became disreputable on the
Protestant side. After nearly five hundred years, the fierce
conflicts of the Reformation seemed to have finally played out in
the United States. 66
II. CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS CONFLICT
The pattern of religious conflict in the United States today
is in some ways very different from that of the Reformation era.
But in some ways the core of the problem remains the same. I
begin with an overview of the current situation, even sketchier
than my overview of the Reformation, and then turn to compari-
sons between the two periods. Not everything in this overview
of the present can be proved or even cited to conventional sources;
some characterizations are based on personal impressions after
working closely for nearly twenty years with people from all
points of the spectrum on these issues.
162. Id.
163. Decree on Ecumenism, in THE DocUMENTs OF VATICAN HI 341, 345
(Walter M. Abbott, S.J. ed., 1966).
164. Id.; see also Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, in THE DOCUMENTS
OF VATICAN I, supra note 163, at 33-34 (acknowledging that Christians not in
union with Rome are, even so, "joined with us in the Holy Spirit"). It is perhaps
more remarkable that the Council acknowledged the prospect of salvation for
Jews, Muslims, and other non-Christian believers in God, and even for "those
who, without blame on their part, have not yet arrived at an explicit knowledge
of God, but who strive to live a good life, thanks to His grace." Id. at 35. This
doctrine has become a point of controversy with conservative Protestants who
insist that salvation requires faith in Christ. See Resolutions for Roman
Catholic and Evangelical Dialogue, reprinted in J.I. Packer, Crosscurrents
Among Evangelicals, in EVANGELICALS AND CATHOLICS TOGETHER: TOWARDS A
COMION MISSION 147, 158 (Charles Colson & Richard John Neuhaus eds.,
1995) [hereinafter EVANGELICALS AND CATHOLICS TOGETHER].
165. Decree on Ecumenism, supra note 163, at 347.
166. Compare TODD, REFORMATION, supra note 4, at 346 ("Towards the end
of the nineteenth century the Reformation gale [in Europe] seemed at last to be
blowing itself out."). In Latin America, the conflict may be just beginning.
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Will Herberg's classic 1955 book, Protestant-Catholic-Jew,
suggested that the United States had solved the problem of
religious conflict, and that it had achieved substantial consensus
on religious matters.16 7 Herberg saw a "civil religion" with the
three principal branches named in his title.16 His analysis of
Protestant-Catholic and Christian-Jewish conflict was right, as
the Kennedy election and consequences of Vatican II dramati-
cally confirmed. But he missed another fault line, just below the
surface and ready to erupt.
The 1960s introduced a period of dramatic reaction against
some of the traditional values of all three faiths: the sexual
revolution, the pornography decisions and the emergence of a
sexual entertainment industry, the women's movement, the
abortion decisions, the gay-rights movement, the school-prayer
decisions, the drug scene, hippies, the counter-culture, dramatic
increases in divorce and illegitimacy, and a general reaction
against authority. Mass demonstrations, the civil-rights
movement, the anti-war movement, and the criminal-procedure
decisions were less religiously salient, but were equally alienat-
ing to many of the social conservatives who were also among the
traditionally religious.
All of these developments contributed to the political
activation of evangelical Christians and eventually to their
successful alliance with other elements of the Reagan coa-
lition;169 this movement in turn led to a counter-reaction by
civil liberties organizations, some Jewish organizations, and
others who thought that the evangelicals were a serious political
threat. The bitter national debates over abortion and gay rights
reactivated anti-Catholic feeling, but the basis was no longer
Protestantism. The new anti-Catholics were feminists, gay
activists, and civil libertarians, and their open hostility was
167. See generally WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIc-JEW (rev. ed.
1960).
168. Id. at 263. Herberg described the "three equi-legitimate religious
communities grounded in the common culture-religion of America" as America's
"civic religion." Id. at 259.
169. For political science accounts of the religious right's eventual rise to
prominence and influence, see generally MATTHEW C. MOEN, THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT (1992); MATTHEW C. MOEN, THE CHRISTIAN
RIGHT AND CONGRESS (1989); KENNETH D. WALD, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE
UNITED STATES 182-219 (1987).
1070
19961 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 1071
equally directed at evangelical Protestants. 17
The result is a polarized debate that extends to a wide range
of religious liberty issues and also to social issues such as
pornography, abortion, feminism, and gay rights. 17' Both sides
have mastered the techniques of fundraising and constitutional
litigation. Secular civil liberties organizations and Jewish
organizations repeatedly line up against evangelical organi-
zations in litigation and in legislative lobbying. Each group
attempts to enlist the educational system on its side, so that
controversies over education have been one of the most prolific
sources of religious liberty litigation. These controversies
include religious observance'72 and curriculum'73 in the pub-
170. For examples of anti-Catholicism, see Edward McGlynn Gaffhey, Jr.,
Hostility to Religion, American Style, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 263, 279-93 (1992); for
a book-length anti-Baptist hate tract, see ARTHUR FREDERICK IDE, EVANGELICAL
TERRORISM: CENSORSHIP, FALWELL, ROBERTSON AND THE SEAMY SIDE OF
CHRISTIAN FUNDAMENTALISM (1986). Fundraising appeals provide frequent
examples. See, e.g., Contribution Memorandum from Americans United for
Separation of Church and State (1995) ("I agree that we must stop the
Christian Coalition, the Roman Catholic hierarchy, and their allies from
destroying public education and demolishing the church/state wall.") (on file
with the Minnesota Law Review); Letter from Edd Doerr, Executive Director,
Americans for Religious Liberty, to members and supporters (Oct. 1995)
("Televangelist Pat Robertson's so-called Christian Coalition and its sectarian
special interest allies are growing in strength and posing increasingly serious
threats to religious freedom, public education, interfaith harmony, and
democratic government.") (on file with the Minnesota Law Review). For amuch
more careful and nuanced argument that religion is a negative force on balance,
see Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A
Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 458-86 (1992) ("[R]eligion
perpetuates and reinforces women's subordination, and religious freedom
impedes reform."). For examination of the theoretical underpinnings of hostility
to religion, see Frederick M. Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78
VA. L. REv. 671 (1992) (arguing that liberal theory excludes religion from public
life); Michael W. McConnell, "God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!" Freedom
of Religion in the Post-modern Age, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 163 (arguing that
liberalism and post-modernism both exclude religion from public life, reducing
religious liberty to a Nietzschean right to "sing, weep, laugh, and mumble" in
private).
171. See generally HUNTER, supra note 160 (assessing the contemporary
"culture wars").
172. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that public
schools may not offer prayers as part of official high school graduation
exercises); Board ofEduc. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (holding that student
religious clubs may meet on school premises); School Dist. of Abington v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that public schools may not offer
religious exercises in classroom).
173. See generally WARREN A. NORD, RELIGION AND AMERICAN EDUCATION:
RETHINKING A NATIONAL DILEMMA (1995) (reviewing the widespread conflict
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lic schools, and financing174 and regulation 75 of private
schools.
There have been important examples of cooperation and
compromise, including the Williamsburg Charter,"6 a Joint
Statement on Religion in the Public Schools, 7 and the spec-
tacularly successful Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion,
in which religious and civil liberties organizations and liberals
over how religion should be treated in the public school curriculum, and
showing that it is rarely treated at all); George W. Dent Jr., Of God and Caesar:
The Free Exercise Rights of Public School Students, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
707 (1993) (arguing for the free exercise right to exempt students from public-
school instruction inconsistent with their religious beliefs). See, e.g., Brown v.
Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that
the Impressions reading series does not establish witchcraft as a religion);
Fleischfresser v. Director of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting
a similar Establishment Clause challenge to the Impressions series); Mozert v.
Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that
parents have no free exercise right to remove their children from elements of
public school curriculum that are in conflict with their faith), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1066 (1988); Coleman v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 635 So.2d 1238 (La. App.
1994) (holding that sex education curriculum can make no moral or ethical
judgments), writ denied, 639 So.2d 1171 (La. 1994).
174. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993)
(holding that a deaf student entitled to a sign-language interpreter at public
expense in public school may use that interpreter at a church-affiliated private
school); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (holding that federally fimded
remedial instruction cannot be offered on the premises of church-affiliated
schools); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that public funds
may not be used to pay teachers at church-affiliated schools); Miller v. Benson,
68 F.3d 163 (7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (deferring issues arising out of voucher
plan for education to pending state-court litigation).
175. See, e.g., EEOC v. Kamehameha Schools, 990 F.2d 458 (9th Cir.)
(holding that school that hired only Protestant teachers was not sufficiently
religious to qualify for exemption from laws against religious discrimination in
employment), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 439 (1993); New Life Baptist Church
Academy v. East Longmeadow, 885 F.2d 940 (1st Cir. 1989) (collecting cases
upholding state regulations that assure minimum educational quality), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990); Kentucky State Bd. for Elem. & Sec. Educ. v.
Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979) (holding that intrusive state regulation of
private schools violated state constitution), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980);
State v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio 1976) (holding that pervasive regulation
of private schools violated the U.S. Constitution).
176. THE WILLIAMSBURG CHARTER, reprinted in 8 J.L. & RELIGION 5 (1990).
177. AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS ET AL., RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
A JOINT STATEMENT OF CURRENT LAW (Apr. 1995). Drafting and endorsing
organizations include the American Civil Liberties Union, the Christian Legal
Society, the National Association of Evangelicals, the National Council of
Churches, People for the American Way, numerous Jewish organizations,
numerous denominational Christian organizations, and Muslim and Sikh
organizations. Id.
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and conservatives worked together to enact the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act.1 8 The Coalition worked because in
principle the civil liberties organizations support regulatory
exemptions for religiously motivated behavior, and because the
Coalition took no position on specific applications of the Act,
which inevitably would have provoked disagreement over
exempting religious minorities from regulation in pursuit of
other issues on the civil liberties agenda. Cooperation on
selected issues is important and politically healthy, but polariza-
tion has been the more common alignment.
James Davison Hunter's book Culture Wars 79 accurately
captures much of the new divide. The principal fight is no
longer between Catholics and Protestants, or between Christians
and Jews, or even between believers and nonbelievers; rather it
is between what Hunter calls "orthodox" and "progressive"
elements of all these groups.' 80 This may just be relabeling of
the political split between left and right on social issues, but it
has important religious dimensions. In Hunter's terminology,
the orthodox remain committed "to an external, definable, and
transcendent authority."' 8 ' Usually this transcendent authority
is religious, but for culturally conservative nonbelievers, it may
be natural law or some other source of moral absolutes.'82 The
progressives tend to view truth "as a process, as a reality that is
ever unfolding."'83  Religious progressives thus tend to
"resymbolize historic faiths according to the prevailing as-
sumptions of contemporary life."8 4
On the "orthodox" side, a clear illustration of Hunter's point
is that Catholics and evangelicals are on the same side of many
moral issues, and some of them are exploring a more formal
alliance,8 5 despite deep disagreements and suspicions over
theology, liturgy, and church authority,186 and less recognized
178. See Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 210-11 & n.9 (1994) (describing
the Coalition and listing its member organizations).
179. HUNTER, supra note 160.
180. Id. at 42-66; see also Noll, supra note 158, at 91-101 (distinguishing
"New" and "Old" Protestants and Catholics, roughly corresponding to Hunter's
progressives and orthodox within those faiths).
181. HUNTER, supra note 160, at 44.
182. Id. at 45-46.
183. Id. at 44.
184. Id. at 44-45.
185. See generally EVANGELICALS AND CATHOLIcs TOGETHER, supra note 164.
186. For the depth of the theological differences, see Packer, supra note 164.
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but measurable differences in ways of thinking about the
world.117 The leading proponents of the current alliance come
from the theologically and socially conservative wings of both
Catholicism and Protestantism; with important exceptions, these
are the groups who were most suspicious of the Protestant-
Catholic rapprochement in the 1960s and who attach the
greatest importance to theological differences today. But today's
alliance between Protestant and Catholic conservatives may not
have been possible if the liberals on each side had not made
peace a generation ago.
I think that Hunter accurately describes the two principal
sides in the culture wars, although he may give insufficient
attention to the moderates in the middle. The activists on each
side, and the audiences for whom their fundraising letters are
tailored, are far more polarized than the bulk of the population;
there is substantial diversity both in the middle and within each
broadly defined "side."'88 There are even moderate activists;
groups such as the National Council of Churches and the Baptist
Joint Committee on Public Affairs file briefs first on one side and
then on the other."9
187. See generally Andrew M. Greeley, Protestant and Catholic: Is the
Analogical Imagination Extinct?, 54 AM. Soc. REV. 485 (1989) (using survey
data to identify a broad array of differences between Catholic and Protestant
world views).
188. See Andrew M. Greeley, With God on Their Sides, N.Y. TIMES BOOK
REV., Nov. 24, 1991, at 13, 14 (reviewing JAMES D. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS
(1991), and concluding that "the American people's reaction to cultural conflicts
is much more complex, nuanced, ambiguous and ambivalent than any two-
category typology might suggest"). I do not disagree with Greeley's analysis,
but I think that Hunter captures one important divide of special relevance to
the law of religious liberty.
189. Compare Brief of National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.
and James E. Andrews as Stated Clerk of the General Assembly of the
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Board
of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994) (No. 93-517) (arguing that
Establishment Clause precludes deliberate creation of public school district with
population all of the same religion) and Brief Amici Curiae of the American
Jewish Congress et al., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (No. 90-1014)
(arguing that Establishment Clause precludes prayer as part of official program
at public school graduation) (joined by Baptist Joint Committee on Public
Affairs, National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., and James E.
Andrews as Stated Clerk of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church
(U.S.A.) with Brief Amicus Curiae of the Christian Legal Society et al., Zobrest
v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (No. 92-94) (arguing that Free
Exercise requires, and Establishment Clause does not forbid, public school
district to pay for deaf student's sign language interpreter on equal terms at
either public or religiously affiliated high school) (joined by National Council of
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An important part of the new situation is the significant
number of avowed nonbelievers and of believers whose belief is
subordinated to a larg6ly secular view of the world. The
historian James Turner has shown that true atheism did not
become intellectually possible until the nineteenth century.90
The political effects of this development were delayed much
longer, but they eventually came. Freud and Dewey gave
skeptical foundations to whole disciplines, 9' and evolution and
its skeptical interpretations became the subject of popular
debate, legislation, litigation, plays, and movies.'92 Modernist
versions of Christianity sought to reconcile religious faith with
the new developments in science, philosophy, and public values,
Churches of Christ in the U.S-); Brief of Baptist Joint Committee on Public
Affairs et al., Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (No. 88-1597)
(arguing that Equal Access Act protects, and Establishment Clause does not
preclude, right of student prayer club to meet in classrooms at public high
school) (joined by National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., and
James E. Andrews as Stated Clerk of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian
Church (U.S.A.)); Brief of National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board
of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990) (No. 88-1374) (arguing that Free Exercise
Clause precludes taxation of not-for-profit sales of books, records, and other
media that convey religious messages); BriefAmicus Curiae of National Council
of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., United States Catholic Conference v.
Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988) (No. 87-416) (defending
Catholic organizations against penalties for contempt of court, invasive
discovery, and attempts to revoke their tax exemptions by private litigation)
(joined by Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs). I should disclose that I
wrote or signed each of these briefs except the one in Zobrest.
190. See generally JAMES TURNER, WITHOUT GOD, WITHOUT CREED (1985)
(tracing social, religious, and intellectual trends that set the stage for modern
atheism).
191. See generally JOHN DEWEY, A COMMON FAITH (1934) (rejecting all
religious claims of supernatural reality, and proposing a religion based on faith
in the accumulated values of human civilization); SIGMUND FREUD, THE FUTURE
OF AN ILLUSION (James Strachey trans., 1961) (first published in 1927) (arguing
that all religious ideas are creations of human imagination).
192. See generally CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859)
(setting out the theory of evolution). See also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578 (1987) (striking down a statute that required the balanced treatment of
creation and evolution science in public schools); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97 (1968) (striking down a statute that forbad teaching of evolution in
public schools and universities); Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927)
(upholding a statute that forbad the teaching of evolution in public schools). A
play based on the Scopes trial, JEROME LAWRENCE & ROBERT E. LEE, INHERIT
THE WIND (1955), was made into a movie in 1960 with Spencer Tracy and Gene
Kelly, and again in 1988 with Kirk Douglas and Jason Robards. LEONARD
MALTIN'S MOVIE AND VIDEO GUIDE 610 (Leonard Maltin ed., 1994 ed.).
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and eventually came to emphasize good works more than
faith. 9 ' Phillip Johnson is surely right that "millions of people
who consider themselves theists ... have to some extent adopted
modernist ways of thinking," by which he means a naturalistic
and rationalist worldview that dominates public discourse and
excludes or marginalizes supernatural explanations.'94 John-
son argues that this worldview is ultimately inconsistent with
theism;'95 it at least makes God a remote abstraction with
little relevance to practical affairs.
Johnson's modernists and Hunter's progressives are
overlapping but far from identical groups. There are religious
progressives for whom God is a real and immediate presence in
their lives. They are as committed as the orthodox to carrying
out God's will, but they interpret that will differently. Their God
may put more emphasis on feeding the hungry, sheltering the
homeless, and correcting injustice, and they may conclude (or
understand God to now reveal), that the traditional sexual
morality of orthodox religion is itself a source of injustice to gays
and lesbians, or that the absolute right to life is a source of
injustice to women and of unnecessary suffering among the
terminally ill. And of course there are devout believers who
understand their God to command large elements of both the
progressive and orthodox agendas-both the traditional religious
concern for the poor and the traditional sexual morality and
commitment to life at all stages. There are as many permu-
tations and gradations of belief as there are persons in the
population, but it can still be useful to identify and label
important sources of agreement and disagreement. Hunter's
progressives are identified by the belief that the moral rules of
religious tradition are changeable; Johnson's modernists are
identified by a worldview in which supernatural interventions
are remote or nonexistent.
The more militant progressive secularists are the functional
equivalent of a new religious movement, and sometimes the legal
equivalent as well. For constitutional purposes, important
elements of secularism must be considered religious, because any
answer to religious questions must be "religion" within the
meaning of the First Amendment. Is there a God? Does He or
193. See TURNER, supra note 190, at 141-202.
194. PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, REASON IN THE BALANCE: THE CASE AGAINST
NATURALISM IN SCIENCE, LAW & EDUCATION 45 (1995).
195. Id. at 37-38.
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She care about human beings? Is there an afterlife? Are there
supernatural forces at work in the universe? The believer says
yes, the humanist manifestos quite explicitly say no,'96 the
agnostic says it is impossible to say, and the indifferent dismiss
the question as utterly irrelevant to anything that matters. The
State cannot persecute any of these answers; neither can it
establish any of them. State-imposed atheism on the Soviet
model would violate any sensible interpretation of the Establish-
ment Clause; persecution of atheists would violate any sensible
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.
Religious progressives and secular progressives disagree
about most matters of theology, but they agree on one important
point that can be put in theological terms: No God handed down
in eternally unchanging form all of the moral rules associated
with traditional religion. On the issue of divine authority for
traditional moral values, religious and secular progressives are
on the same side.
Characterizing the dispute in religious terms also fits the
sociological reality. The culture wars of the last thirty years are
very like the battles of the Reformation with a substantial
reduction in levels of force. In the Reformation and in our time,
a new set of answers to eternal questions became sufficiently
widespread to destabilize social arrangements. Then the new
answers were the various versions of Protestantism; today the
new answers are the various versions of secularism and
progressive or modernist religion.
The claim of a culture war is in seeming tension with survey
data, which overwhelmingly indicate that overall levels of
religious belief and participation are not much changed from
196. See PAUL KURTZ ET AL., A SECULAR HUMANIST DECLARATION 18 (1980)
("[W]e find that traditional views of the existence of God either are meaningless,
have not yet been demonstrated to be true, or are tyrannically exploitative....
In spite of the fact that human beings have found religions to be uplifting and
a source of solace, we do not find their theological claims to be true."); Humanist
Manifesto I, reprinted in CORLISS LAMONT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUANISM 285,
286 (7th ed. 1990) ("Humanism asserts that the nature of the universe depicted
by modern science makes unacceptable any supernatural or cosmic guarantees
of human values."); Humanist Manifesto II, reprinted in LAMONT, supra, at 290,
292-93 ("We find insufficient evidence for belief in the existence of a super-
natural .... [We can discover no divine purpose or providence for the human
species .... No deity will save us; we must save ourselves. ... Promises of
immortal salvation or fear of eternal damnation are both illusory and
harmful.").
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earlier generations. 97 So why do so many believers feel under
siege? Part of the explanation is that Hunter's religious
progressives and Johnson's theistic modernists show up as
believers in opinion polls, but are often on the secular side of
culture war issues; part of the explanation is that nonbelievers
are disproportionately in elite positions, where they have
disproportionate influence on public discourse.
Certainly nonbelief has become respectable among elites;
indeed, I have the subjective sense that the burden of justifi-
cation has shifted, and now the question is whether it is
intellectually respectable to believe. 9' I remember reading
newspaper stories (before I was in the job market myself, so this
was probably in the 1960s) about how it was bad for your
corporate career not to attend church-preferably a mainline
Protestant church. Today the career incentives appear to have
switched; it is conventional wisdom among believing lawyers
that church-affiliated volunteer work should be omitted from
resumes, although it appears still to be true that mainline
Protestant churches are more acceptable on resumes than
evangelical or Catholic churches. 99
J share Stephen Carter's sense that many in the elite view
religion as trivial. °° Data are hard to come by, but anecdotal
evidence abounds.2' I have heard several colleagues say that
religious claims are absurd, ridiculous, irrational, or unworthy
of respect. I have never heard a colleague, at any of the three
law schools where I have taught, make a religious claim in an
academic context. When the student chapter of the Christian
Legal Society at The University of Texas needed a speaker, I
197. The most systematic collection of data is ANDREW M. GREELEY,
RELIGIOUS CHANGE IN AMERICA (1989). For an overview that includes more
recent data, see R. Stephen Warner, Work in Progress Toward a New Paradigm
for the Sociological Study of Religion in the United States, 98 AM. J. SOC. 1044,
1048-50 (1993). Some of this data is summarized infra at notes 232-245.
198. For a similar view, see Michael Novak, The Conservative Mood, 31
SoCIETY 13, 19 (Jan. 1994) ("Increasingly, religion and those who take religion
seriously are ridiculed by sophisticated elites.")
199. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZES RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 7 (1993)
(reporting that an executive search firm advised a client to remove such
information from his resume.) Professor Robert Destro of Catholic University
told a similar story at a conference at Marquette University in March, 1994.
200. CARTER, supra note 199, at 3-15.
201. See, e.g., George M. Marsden, Religious Professors Are the Last Taboo,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 1993, at A10 (arguing that it is "unacceptable" in many
American universities for faculty to state religious views).
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knew of only three or four church-attending colleagues on a
faculty of sixty-five, none in the evangelical mode the students
were seeking.
There may well be others; James Lindgren has survey data
showing that a substantial majority of law professors profess
conventional Christian or Jewish religious views.2"2 These
numbers are much higher than either he or I would have
guessed based on personal experience in several law schools.
One inference is that the believers feel obliged to be quiet about
it. Toleration and even respect for nonbelievers is a great
advance for human liberty. But disrespect and even intolerance
of religious belief is an offsetting loss of equal importance.
Commenting on an earlier draft of this article, Michael
McConnell suggested that the historical model for this conflict is
not the Reformation at all, but the French Revolution. Among
the many commitments of the revolutionaries were science,
rationalism, naturalistic explanations, intense anti-clericalism,
and a short lived but vigorous and often violent attempt to de-
Christianize France." 3 A permanent anti-clerical faction in
France was among the Revolution's legacies.20 4 The commit-
ment to naturalistic explanations has grown and spread ever
since, at least among elites, and modem secularism is often
affirmatively hostile to traditional religious belief. I am
skeptical of any direct historical connection between the French
Revolution and American secularism, but it does seem clear that
they share common ancestry in the Enlightenment. Whatever
its origins, the conflict between traditional religious believers
and those who are fearful of or hostile to traditional belief is one
of the central social divides of our time.
The growing influence of secularism does not mean that
religion will fade away. This conflict is not likely to end with
only secularists, progressives, and theistic modernists remaining;
the human need for spiritual explanations runs too deep. Even
among those who turn away from traditional faiths, some
202. Lindgren mentioned these data in personal conversation in January,
1996. Publication arrangements are pending.
203. See EMMET KENNEDY, A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVO-
LUTION xxiv, 59-76, 145-55, 338-53 (1989) (tracing the sources of the
revolutionaries' antipathy to religion and describing the de-Christianizing
campaign); see also CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT, THE DAYS OF THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION 230-33 (1980) (describing the de-Christianizing campaign).
204. See KENNEDY, supra note 203, at 376-77, 379, 384-92 (describing
nineteenth-century conflicts between this faction and the Catholic Church).
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significant portion turn to a new wave of religions outside the
Judeo-Christian tradition. These faiths represent a small
fraction of all Americans, but they produce a disproportionate
share of all religious liberty litigation, because the larger society
has not accommodated their beliefs and practices and because
they are often fervent about asserting them. These include
so-called cults, such as the Unification Church,"' the Hare
Krishnas,"' and the Scientologists; °7 the growing interest
in Islam, especially among African-Americans; 08 a new reli-
gious assertiveness by American Indians; °9 and the great
variety of unorganized spiritualism that goes under the label
New Age.
Significant sections of bookstores are devoted to claims of
Divine Forces in every human, of multiple planes of existence,
and similar claims that are as supernatural and miraculous as
anything in traditional religions. On the eve of this lecture, an
affiliate of the Book-of-the-Month Club was promoting The Art
205. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (striking down a
Minnesota law that used the percentage of contributions from members and
nonmembers to target the Unification Church for special regulation of fund
solicitation); Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1988) (allowing a trial
on claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress, but not for
false imprisonment based on a claim that religious teaching persuaded plaintiffs
to remain in Unification Church), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
206. See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505
U.S. 672 (1992) (upholding restrictions on solicitation in airport, but striking
down restrictions on distribution of leaflets in airport); Heffron v. International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding
restrictions on solicitation at state fair).
207. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (holding that
payments for Scientology auditing are not deductible as charitable contri-
butions, absent proof that the IRS discriminated among faiths that charge for
religious benefits); Church of Scientology Int'l v. United States Dept. of Justice,
30 F.3d 224 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that the Justice Department had not
sufficiently justified its refusal to disclose records of investigation of fraud
against the Church); Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc. v. City of
Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir. 1993) (striking down parts of a charitable
solicitation ordinance), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 54 (1994); Wollersheim v. Church
of Scientology, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (remitting part of a
judgment for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
208. See, e.g., O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (upholding prison work
schedule that made it impossible for Muslim inmates to attend Friday services).
209. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (refusing to
protect right to participate in peyote worship services); Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (refusing to enjoin
construction of road through sacred site on public land); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693 (1986) (refusing to order government not to use social security number to
identify recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children).
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of Dreaming by Carlos Castaneda. This is the latest in a series
of books claiming "that ours is just one world in a vast cluster of
realities-and that we all have the ability, by using body energy
and the 'four gates' of dreams, to cross the boundaries and visit
these incredible places."210 Castaneda has reportedly sold
eight million books, and a New York Times columnist has
written that he "must be taken seriously as one of the important
intellectual forces of our time."21' Only a trivial number of
Americans say that their religion is "New Age,"212 but that
must be because they do not think of it as a religion, or because
they syncretically combine their interest in New Age mysticism
with elements of more traditional religion. A fifth to nearly half
the population report belief in various supernatural claims
associated with New Age-reincarnation, astrology, witchcraft,
magical powers, and extra-sensory perception.213
At least some humanists understand the persistence of
spiritual longings; they have been busily trying to fill the
functions of religion. Paul Kurtz has written a secular humanist
ethics.214 Corliss Lamont wrote humanist services for wed-
dings and funerals, with readings from poetry and from carefully
selected passages from the Jewish and Christian scriptures.
215
These efforts are entirely appropriate developments of their
position; my point is not that the humanists are inconsistent.
My point is that they offer express answers to the central
questions of religion, directly attacking more traditional
answers, and they seek to perform the traditional social
functions of religion. The humanists cannot claim a legal status
different from any other group answering the same questions,
debating the same issues, and performing the same functions.
The Christian right has been claiming unsuccessfully that
the schools have established secular humanism.216 They have
210. QUALITY PAPERBACK CLUB, VISIONS OF THE SPIRIT (1994).
211. Ray Walters, Paperback Talk, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1981, at 35. For the
sales figures, see Benjamin Epstein, The Mystical Man, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26,
1995, at El.
212. See BARRY A. KOSMIN & SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN, ONE NATION UNDER
GOD: RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN SOCIETY 17 (1993) (reporting 12
respondents in a survey of 113,000).
213. NORD, supra note 173, at 193 (collecting survey data).
214. PAUL KURTz, FORBIDDEN FRUIT: THE ETHICS OF HUMANISM (1988).
215. CORLISS LAMONT, AHUMANIST FUNERAL SERVICE (2d ed. 1977); CORLISS
LAMONT, A HUMANIST WEDDING SERVICE (3d ed. rev. 1972).
216. See, e.g., Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987)
(rejecting such a claim); Mary H. Mitchell, Secularism in Public Education: The
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lost those suits, but not on the commonly offered ground that
secular humanism is not a religion. The schools should win
these cases on the ground that they have not taught secular
humanist theology. They have not taught that there is no God
and that human reason is all we can rely on.217 What the
schools have taught is moral and social values associated with
secular humanism, and also with modernist versions of other
religions: reasoned inquiry, individual judgment, tolerance,
sexual permissiveness, etc. Schools in a democracy are entitled
to teach these values, if that is what the majority wants, just as
they are entitled to teach more traditional values if a majority
wants that. Church and State both have spoken to morals
throughout our history. On moral questions, we argue and we
vote; no other solution is possible in a democracy, even though
some moral positions turn out to be inconsistent with some
theological positions. We can exempt those with religious
reasons for noncompliance with particular laws, but general
public policy and the operation of public institutions must
inevitably be based on the moral decisions of political bodies.
The principle here is that of Harris v. McRae: A law that
coincides with the moral teachings of some religion does not
establish that religion. 1' This is equally true of Catholic
moral teaching and secular humanist moral teaching. Constitu-
tional limits on State enforcement of morals are to be found, if
at all, in unenumerated rights to autonomy in certain personal
decisions.219 They are not to be found in the Establishment
Clause, or in barring certain kinds of political arguments. The
First Amendment does not privilege either side in the culture
wars.
Yet the idea is seriously afoot that religious arguments are
excluded, limited, or at least somehow suspect, in the political
Constitutional Issues, 67 B.U. L. REV. 603 (1987) (analyzing these claims and
concluding that secular humanism is a religion but that in most cases, it has
not been established).
217. See supra note 196 (quoting secular humanist answers to theological
questions).
218. 448 U.S. 297, 318-20 (1980) (holding that government policy that
accords with the moral teaching of one or more religions does not establish
those religions).
219. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (locating the right
to an abortion in the Due Process Clause); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 482-85 (1965) (locating the right to use contraceptives in the penumbras
of the Free Speech Clause and the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments,
without alluding to the Establishment Clause).
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process. Bruce Ackerman 2 ° Robert Audi,221 Christopher
Eisgruber,222 Kent Greenawalt,223 Abner Greene,2" William
Marshall, 225  Michael Perry,226  Lawrence Solum, 227  and
220. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE
(1980) (arguing that political arguments may not presuppose any theory of the
good or claim to give any privileged answers). For a powerful debate over the
application of this principle to religious arguments, hear Bruce Ackerman, Kent
Greenawalt, and Michael McConnell, The Religious Voice in the Public Square,
Oral Presentation at Association of American Law Schools (Jan. 1996)
(recording in collection of Jamail Research Center, The University of Texas
School of Law).
221. See Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and
Democratic Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677 (1993) (arguing that coercive
public policy should be based only on accessible reasons, and that religious
reasons are not accessible) [hereinafter Audi, Argument]; Robert Audi, The
Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship, 18 PHIL. &
PUB. AFFAIRS 259, 274-96 (1989) (arguing that individuals have a duty not to
support legislation unless they are actually motivated by secular reasons).
222. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison's Wager: Religious Liberty in the
Constitutional Order, 89 Nw. U.L. REV. 347, 362-64 (1995) (arguing that
political actors must give publicly accessible reasons for their positions, and
that most religious reasons are not publicly accessible).
223. See KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS
(1995) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, CONSCIENCES] (arguing that citizens should
not base political positions exclusively on religious reasons, and that public
figures should make political arguments in exclusively secular terms); KENT
GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988) (similar
arguments); Kent Greenawalt, Grounds for Political Judgment: The Status of
Personal Experience and the Autonomy and Generality of Principles of Restraint,
30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 647 (1993) (similar arguments).
224. See Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102
YALE L.J. 1611, 1622-23 (1993) (arguing that the Establishment Clause
prohibits legislators from making religious arguments in public political debate,
and that it prohibits legislation motivated by a religious reason unless the
reason can be translated into a secular argument that the nonbeliever views as
made in good faith). For further debate, compare Scott C. Idleman, Ideology as
Interpretation: A Reply to Professor Greene's Theory of the Religion Clauses,
1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, with Abner S. Greene, Is Religion Special? A
Rejoinder to Scott Idleman, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 535.
225. See Marshall, supra note 2, at 844-45 (arguing for special constraints
on religion's role in public decisionmaking).
226. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND
MORALITY IN AiERICAN POLITICS (1991) (arguing that political arguments
should be excluded if they claim infallibility or if they are inaccessible to others,
and that sectarian religious argument tends to fall in these categories); Michael
J. Perry, Toward an Ecumenical Politics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 599, 599-608
(1992) [hereinafter Perry, Politics] (similar arguments); Michael J. Perry,
Religious Morality and Political Choice: Further Thoughts-and Second
Thoughts-on Love and Power, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 703 (1993) (modifying
earlier positions and appearing to argue that religious arguments are fully
admissible in political debate and may be the basis of political decisions);
Michael J. Perry, Religion in Politics, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 1996)
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Kathleen Sullivan22 all have offered versions of this argument.
Fortunately, their proposals are generally far more moderate
than their rhetoric. Mostly they wind up conceding that
religious arguments in politics are protected by the text of the
Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, and by the constitution-
al structure of democracy.29 I would add that the evidence
from the original understanding is equally strong. The evangeli-
cal sects who successfully demanded the Establishment Clause
certainly were not silencing or disfranchising their members.23 °
(modifying position again and arguing that religious arguments cannot be the
basis of coercive regulation unless supported by at least one secular argument,
except that the argument that all humans are sacred is always admissible).
227. See Lawrence B. Solum, Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason, 30 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 729 (1993) (arguing that only public reasons can be the basis of
coercive regulation, and that religious reasons are not public).
228. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI.
L. REv. 195, 222 (1992) (arguing that the Constitution requires the "banishment
of religion from the public square").
229. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, CONSCIENCES, supra note 223 (formulating his
proposals as principles of self-restraint, not as rules of law); Audi, Argument,
supra note 221, at 700 (stating that his proposed restrictions on political
argument describe "an aspect of civic virtue, not a limitation of civil (or other)
rights"); Eisgruber, supra note 222, at 378-81 (arguing that laws enacted in
response to religious arguments are not for that reason unconstitutional);
Marshall, supra note 2, at 862-63 (conceding free speech rights but concluding
that religion in the public square can be constrained by a "prevailing social
norm" that religion is "off-limits" in politics); Perry, Politics, supra note 226, at
617 (stressing that the requirement of public accessibility is not a legal
prerequisite and that it is not an "insurmountable obstacle" to making
appropriate religious arguments in public debate); Sullivan, supra note 228, at
197, 201 (conceding that religious arguments in public debate are protected
speech, and that such views may influence the debate, provided that public
moral disputes are resolved on grounds "articulable" in secular terms).
230. On the critical role of evangelicals in demanding an Establishment
Clause, see CURRY, supra note 107, at 134-37, 141, 143-46, 148-51, 156-57, 163-
77, 179-83, 185-89, 195, 198-99, 216-17; McConnell, Origins, supra note 143, at
1436-43. For defenses of the equal right to make either religious or secular
arguments in political debate, see Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and
the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 763 (1993) (rejecting claims
of epistemological distinction between faith and reason or religious and secular
arguments); Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Politics Without Brackets on
Religious Convictions: Michael Perry and Bruce Ackerman on Neutrality, 64
TULANE L. REV. 1143 (1990) (reviewing the role of religion in debates over
slavery, civil rights, and immigration, and arguing that "[rieligious bodies...
surely enjoy at least the same rights as other persons and groups to participate
fully in the political process"); Maimon Schwarzschild, Religion and Public
Debate in a Liberal Society:Always Oil and Water or Sometimes More Like Rum
and Coca-Cola?, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 903 (1993) (arguing that although it may
have been rational to view Christianity as the prime threat to liberalism in
eighteenth-century Europe, it is erroneous to view religion in this way today);
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On most religious issues today, there is no majority. All the
principal antagonists perceive themselves as minorities who
have been mistreated on at least some issues. This is true in my
experience even of the Catholics and liberal Protestants. The
evangelicals, Jews, secular humanists, civil libertarians, and the
so-called cults all appear to perceive themselves as threatened
minorities, whose values may be overwhelmed and their liberty
curtailed by a majority that ranges from indifferent to hostile.
Few of these people genuinely fear that their worship will be
forbidden, or that they will be forced to worship against their
will. But many on both sides fear that pervasive regulation in
pursuit of the other side's moral and political values will make
their lives intolerable.2 31
Each side in the culture wars tends to impute the moderates
to the other side, exaggerating its own sense of being outnum-
bered and victimized. The nonbeliever sees polls that show a
population overwhelmingly religious and almost as overwhelm-
ingly Christian, and he feels badly threatened. In the largest-
ever survey of religious affiliation, conducted in 1990 with a
sample size of 113,000, 86.2% of respondents described them-
selves as some variety of Christian, and 3.3% claimed some other
religion. 2  Agnostics, humanists, and "no religion" totaled
8.2%; the remaining 2.3% refused to answer 3  When the
question is phrased as whether the respondent believes in "God
or a Universal Spirit," the percentage of affirmative answers
rises to the mid-nineties, and this result has been remarkably
stable over decades. 4 As surprising as it may be to academ-
ics, confessed nonbelievers are a single-digit minority.
David Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in Postmodern
America: A Response to Professor Perry, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1067 (1991) (arguing
that "fairness requires that either side of America's contemporary cultural
conflict be allowed to win"); Jeremy Waldron, Religious Contributions in Public
Deliberation, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 817 (1993) (using the example of the
Catholic bishops' letter on economic justice to argue for the relevance and
accessibility of religious arguments in political debate).
231. See Smolin, supra note 230, at 1097 ("The loser will live in a society
that is hostile to the continuance of their ways of life, even if force is not
literally used to destroy them.").
232. KOSMIN & LACHMAN, supra note 212, at 2-3, 15-17.
233. Id.
234. See GEORGE BARNA, VIRTUAL AMERICA 107 (1994) (1993-1994 data; 95%
believe in "God or universal force"); GREELEY, supra note 197, at 14 (citing
Gallup and General Social Survey data from 1944, 1954, 1967, and 1981; 95-
97% believe in "God or universal spirit").
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These numbers are real, but they also are misleading. Only
about three-quarters believe in life after death,235 and only
about two-thirds believe that God is "the all-powerful, all-
knowing Creator of the universe who rules the world today."236
These are still lopsided majorities, but now we begin to see huge
minorities: Nearly 30% of theists and 20% of self-declared
Christians apparently have unorthodox views on fundamental
points. Only 60-70% of the population report that they are
members of a church or religious organization.237 Only about
40% report attending church or synagogue in any given
week,238 and a recent study based on actually counting people
at services suggests that the real number is only about 20%.239
That is, people appear to report going to church about twice as
often as they actually go. The conservative Christian whose
values regularly are rejected in public policy decisions ° sees
much of the Christian majority as only nominally Christian-as
effectively on the other side. In his view, most Christians have
accommodated their religious belief to the secular values of the
modern age. He too feels outnumbered and threatened.
The evangelical pollster George Barna strikingly illustrates
this view. His polls confirm the standard result that 95% of
American adults profess belief "in God or a universal force."24'
But on the basis of answers to questions about specific religious
beliefs, he concludes that only 67% 'have an orthodox Judeo-
235. GREELEY, supra note 197, at 14 & Table 2.1.
236. BARNA, supra note 234, at 109.
237. Warner, supra note 197, at 1049 (citing Gallup poll data from 1990
(69%) and General Social Survey data from 1991 (61%); reporting peak of 73%
in 1960s); see also KOSMIN & LACHMAN, supra note 212, at 6, 9 (citing church
surveys from 1890 to 1936, and Gallup poll data after World War II, with
estimates of church membership ranging from 45% in 1890 to 62% in 1990s).
238. See GREELEY, supra note 197, at 43 (citing Gallup poll data from 1939
(41%) to 1984 (40%), with low of 37% in 1940 and high of 49% in 1955).
Similarly consistent polling data from multiple sources extending into more
recent years is collected in C. Kirk Haddaway et al., What the Polls Don't Show:
A Closer Look at U.S. Church Attendance, 58 AM. Soc. REV. 741, 741-42 (1993).
239. See Haddaway et al., supra note 238, at 742, 743-48 (estimating 19.6%
attendance among Protestants in a typical Ohio county and 25% attendance
among Catholics in 18 dioceses).
240. See David Frum, Dead Wrong, NEW REPUBLIc, Sept. 12, 1994, at 17
(arguing that the Christian Right has little power to impose its policy
preferences).
241. BARNA, supra note 234, at 109.
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Christian view of God."242 He further concludes that 7% of the
population is "evangelical," 28% is Torn-again" but not evangeli-
cal, and 65% is "non-Christian."243 He explains that according
to the Bible, those who are not born again are not Christian.2'
Christians with a different theology reasonably may feel that his
definitions have excluded them for heresy. I do not endorse his
definitions, but I report them for what they show about per-
ceptions: both the nonbeliever and the evangelical can see them-
selves as part of a single-digit minority.
Barna also says, based on his general impressions and not
a specific survey question, that "most Americans merely dabble
in spirituality. They use it as a quick fix during crisis points, as
a sedative to assuage their guilt or as a means to a worldly
end. 245
Because each group perceives itself as a mistreated minority,
each appeals to the American tradition of protecting minority
rights from the majority. The duality of the Religion Clauses
makes it easier to structure the debate in this way. The
religious groups generally appeal to the Free Exercise Clause,
and their opponents to the Establishment Clause. The per-
ception has become widespread that the Free Exercise Clause is
pro-religion and the Establishment Clause is anti-religion. On
this view, the two clauses are in serious conflict. Each side
tends to believe that its own preferred clause should be broadly
construed and vigorously enforced, and that it should prevail in
any conflict with the other clause. The distilled essence of this
242. Id. at 107. The criterion was the question quoted in text at note 236
supra, whether God is "the all-powerful, all-knowing Creator of the universe
who rules the world today."
243. Id. Barna counted as Christians those who claimed "a personal
commitment to Christ that is still important in their lives today," and who
believe they "will go to heaven because they have confessed their sins and
accepted Jesus Christ as their Savior." Id. at 18. Gallup poll data report that
about 70% of the population believes that "there is a heaven where people who
have led good lives are eternally rewarded." GREELEY, supra note 197, at 14
(citing data from 1952, 1965, and 1980). Barna, following Calvin (and also
Luther), rejects this reliance on works rather than faith. BARNA, supra note
234, at 17-18. Barna defined evangelicals as Christians who say "religion is
important in their lives," agree with his "orthodox Judeo-Christian concept of
God," reject the view that one can get to heaven by doing good works, believe
"that the Bible is accurate in all that it teaches," believe that Satan "is a living
force" and not a mere "symbol of evil," and acknowledge a personal responsibi-
lity "to tell other people their religious beliefs." Id. at 17-18.
244. BARNA, supra note 234, at 18.
245. Id. at 108.
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argument appears in Suzanna Sherry's article, Paradox
Redux,246 which argues that the two clauses are inherently
inconsistent and that the basic and perhaps only important
choice is deciding which one to subordinate to the other.247
This is a mistake at the most fundamental level, and not
just because it imputes incoherence to the Founders. The
Religion Clauses were no compromise of conflicting interests, but
the unified demand of the most vigorous advocates of religious
liberty.
More fundamentally, this interpretation inverts an essential
purpose of the clauses: to enable people of fundamentally
different religious views to live together in peace and equality,
cooperating in the task of self-governance, with no one forced to
suffer for their faith. Under the widespread interpretation that
Professor Sherry has crystallized, the clauses can mean only that
one side wins and the other side is subordinated. This interpre-
tation abandons the goal of equality, it guarantees conflict over
who will win and who will be subordinated, and it greatly
increases the risk that those who are subordinated will suffer for
their faith.
We think of the Reformation as principally a bipolar conflict
between Protestants and Catholics, even though there were
many internal conflicts on each side, and cross-cutting issues of
comparable importance, such as the rise of nationalism, capital-
ism, and representative parliaments. We are much more aware
of the subdivisions and cross-cutting issues in our own time, and
it is harder to identify or precisely describe the most funda-
mental lines of division. But at least one of the fundamental
divisions is religious, and the line of division is approximately
between those who believe that God has laid down eternal and
inflexible moral laws that govern both their public and private
behavior, and those who do not-those who do not believe in
God, or do not experience their God as so inflexible, or experi-
ence God as relevant only to their private life.
This division has replaced Protestant-Catholic and Chris-
tian-Jewish divisions as the fundamental source of religious
conflict, and mediation of this conflict must therefore be a core
purpose of the Religion Clauses. The question for the Religion
246. Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 Sup. CT. REV.
123.
247. Id. at 124.
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Clauses in our time is not whether progressives and modernists
should triumph over orthodox and traditionalists (or vice versa),
but how all these groups can live together in peace and equality,
cooperating in the task of self-governance, with no one forced to
suffer for their faith or lack of one.
III. COMPARING THE TWO ERAS
A. THE SOURCE OF PERSECUTION
What was the central evil of the Reformation-era religious
conflicts? Correspondingly, what is the central evil against
which the Religion Clauses were aimed? There are two very
different and widely held answers to these questions. Either:
1. Human beings suffered for their religious beliefs and
practices; or
2. Religions imposed suffering on human beings.
On the first account, the fundamental purpose of the Religion
Clauses is to protect the religious choices of human beings. Or
as Michael McConnell has put it, "[t]he great evil against which
the Religion Clauses are directed is government-induced
homogeneity" in religion.248 On the second account, the funda-
mental purpose is to prevent religion from ever causing such
trouble again. On the first account, the principal threat to
religious liberty is the State; on the second account, the principal
threat is religions.
There is some truth in both accounts; religions were both
persecutors and persecutees in the Reformation era. But there
is far more truth in the first account; it was the State that had
the power to persecute. Religious pronouncements had no effect
without the temporal power of the State. Interdicts and
excommunication had no effect on those who had already
repudiated the interdicting or excommunicating authority.
Even under the various Inquisitions, where the Church may
have been most culpable, power to inflict temporal punishment
was reserved to the State. This reservation of State power was
often a bare formality,249 but it left ultimate authority in the
248. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 115, 168 (1992).
249. See 3 HENRY CHARLES LEA, A HISTORY OF THE INQUISITION OF SPAIN
183-90 (1907) (reviewing the practice of abandoning convicted heretics to "the
secular arm," and noting that execution generally followed without any
independent judgment by the State).
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State, so that the Inquisition "was effective where the secular
ruler proved cooperative."25 ° The form and vigor of the Inqui-
sitions varied sharply over time and place, often in response to
local law and politics." 1 Sometimes the State took the lead
and the restraining influence came from the Church. For
example, it was Ferdinand and Isabella, and not a pope, bishop,
or religious order, who invigorated the Spanish Inquisition and
appointed Tomas de Torquemada, the most infamous of the
Inquisitors General. 2 The Spanish Inquisition was always
subject to the Crown, and only secondarily to the Pope; the
Kings of Spain always appointed the Inquisitors General and
had effective power to secure their resignation.253 More gener-
250. SPrTz, supra note 3, at 302 (speaking of the Roman Inquisition during
the Counter-Reformation); see also 1 LEA, supra note 249, at 289 ("[Tlhroughout
Christendom the relations between Church and State were too often antagonis-
tic for [the Inquisition's] commands always to receive obedience."). For
examples, see WILL DURANT, THE RENAISSANCE 527-28 (1952) (reporting that
the Signory of Brescia refused to execute witches condemned by the Inquisition,
despite papal excommunication of secular officials who refused to carry out the
religious judgments without further inquiry); PETERS, supra note 14, at 110
(reporting that Italian city-states successfully insisted that local representatives
sit with the Roman Inquisition and that secular authorities review severe
sentences).
251. See PETERS, supra note 14, at 71-74 (comparing operation of Inqui-
sitions in different countries in the late middle ages and early modern period).
252. On Ferdinand's personal role, and on the relation of the Inquisition to
the Spanish Crown, see 1 LEA, supra note 249, at 157-58, 172-77, 230-33, 289-
98, 322-25; PETERS, supra note 14, at 85. The Spanish Inquisition "happened
thanks to its architect and builder, who was, without question, Kind Ferdinand
of Aragon." BENZION NETANYAHU, THE ORIGINS OF THE INQUISITION IN
FIFTEENTH CENTURY SPAIN 1005 (1995). For an account of Torquemada, see
ROLAND H. BAINTON, THE TRAVAIL OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 33-53 (1951). The
Spanish Inquisition was unique, although not in ways that make it any less
horrifying. Its primary target was the conversos, Jews who had converted (or
whose ancestors had converted) to Christianity, most of them to escape
murderous mobs in 1391, oppressive legislation of 1412, or expulsion from the
country in 1492. HENRY KAMEN, INQUISITION AND SOCIETY IN SPAIN IN THE
SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES 7-13, 18 (1985). Many conversos held
prominent positions in government, finance, and even the church hierarchy;
many were married into noble families. Id. at 18-19, 42. Their Christianity
was always suspect; forced conversions did not spare them from anti-Semitism.
The Spanish Inquisition lasted 300 years, but three-quarters of its victims were
executed in the first 20 years, and well over 90% of the victims in that early
period were conversos. Id. at 41-42. A major new history argues that most of
the conversos were genuinely Christian, and that the underlying causes of the
campaign against them were economic, racist, and nationalist, and not religious.
NETANYAHU, supra. For a summary of this very lengthy argument, see id. at
1041-47.
253. 3 LEA, supra note 249, at 302-05.
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ally, studies of court records have revealed that the religious
judges of the Inquisitions were more lenient on average, and
responsible for many fewer executions, than secular judges
conducting heresy trials in other countries at the same time.254
Steven Carter argues that the purpose of the Religion
Clauses was to protect religion from the State. 5 That is close,
but not quite right; the purpose was to protect religious choice
from the State, and religious choice includes the choice of
disbelief. Robert Alley says that Carter has it backward, that
the purpose was to protect the State from religion.256 And,
Alley says, "church and religion must first corrupt government
before that state, in turn oppresses."2 ' As an historical claim
this is simply not true, and it is most clearly not true in the case
of England, the most relevant precedent. Henry's motives were
entirely secular. No Church took over his government; he took
over the Church. To get his way, he had to execute the leading
bishop and intimidate the rest.
The second view has been stated with more sophistication
by Kathleen Sullivan, who repeatedly says the purpose of the
Religion Clauses was to end "the war of all sects against
all."25 In her view, the State has imposed a truce on the
warring religious sects.
The war of all against all does not accurately describe the
Reformation-era conflicts. In almost every case, a better
description would be that it was a war of one against all--of the
State and its chosen religion against all the others. And the
State was an active participant with independent motivations of
its own. Even the four-cornered English conflict mostly fit the
pattern of one-against-all. It was the Anglican Royalists against
254. See PETERS, supra note 14, at 87; see also id. at 111-12 (noting that
secular tribunals in Italy complained that Roman Inquisition was too lenient
on witchcraft).
255. CARTER, supra note 199, at 115-16.
256. Robert S. Alley, The Culture of Disbelief. Trivial Pursuit, CHURCH &
STATE, Dec. 1993, at 19, 20.
257. Id. Despite the breadth of this statement, it is possible that in context,
he is asserting that this would be true only of democratic governments. This
more limited claim is belied by Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
and all other cases of democratic regulation of religion for secular reasons.
Alley apparently agrees that Smith oppresses religion; he calls the decision
"infamous." Id. With respect to both democratic and nondemocratic govern-
ments, Alley has not thought through the implications of secular motivations
for restricting religious liberty.
258. Sullivan, supra note 228, at 197.
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everyone else until the Puritans took over the State; then the
Puritans turned on the Scots Presbyterians and the Irish
Catholics. Shifting fortunes dictated temporary alliances; for
example, Catholics supported the Royalists during the Civil War
because they feared the Puritans and Presbyterians more.259
The Catholic James II tried to save his throne by offering
concessions to the dissenting Protestants, but this was one-
against-all again: a desperate attempt to create an alliance of
religious minorities against the Anglican majority and an
Anglican Parliament more powerful than the King. ° For
most of the long period of religious conffict, one faith at a time
controlled the government, and the government determined
policy toward the other faiths.
The pattern of one-against-all continued in this country:
Baptists, Quakers, Presbyterians, Mennonites, and Methodists
united in their opposition to the Congregational establishment
in New England and to the Episcopal establishment in the
South. It was these evangelical sects that successfully de-
manded both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause."'
One-against-all broke down when no one religion was strong
enough to dominate. Among the first religious minorities to gain
toleration were those too large to be suppressed: recall that
Luther was safe in Wittenberg because the Emperor was afraid
to arrest him there. 2 The Anglicans promised toleration to
the Protestant dissenters because they feared a Catholic-
dissenter alliance.263 When the dominant religion made con-
cessions out of weakness, this was the first step on the road to
religious pluralism. When there are so many religions that no
one of them can hope to dominate, religious liberty is largely
safe from other religions. This was Madison's insight in
Federalist 51.264 The multiplicity of religious factions compet-
259. DAVIES, supra note 87, at 210-11.
260. See PRALL, supra note 131, at 143-46 (explaining why a Catholic-
dissenter alliance could not succeed against an Anglican majority).
261. See sources cited supra note 230.
262. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
263. See supra text accompanying note 134.
264. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 324 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("In a free
government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious
rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the
other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will
depend on the number of interests and sects.").
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ing in the marketplace of ideas-what Sullivan condemns as the
war of all sects against all-is in fact an important structural
protection for religious liberty."5
The protection provided by religious pluralism is not
foolproof, even as against other religions. A coalition of similar
religions can unite to oppress a dissimilar religion, or a coalition
of religious and secular interest groups can unite to suppress a
religion they dislike for quite independent reasons. 6  More-
over, experience and public choice theory have revealed what
Madison failed to recognize:2 67 a well-organized political minor-
ity can do the same things if its victims are smaller in number,
not well-organized, or lacking political influence for some other
reason.
Although religions work to suppress other religions in these
scenarios, they do so through the ordinary political process and
through the coercive power of the State. The mechanisms by
which a religious minority might be suppressed in a religiously
pluralist state are identical whether the political faction
demanding suppression is a coalition of other religions, or a
secular interest group demanding activist regulation without
exceptions for religious dissenters. And in our time, one religion
attempting to suppress another is a rare event compared to the
far more common case of a secular interest group attempting to
suppress a religious practice."'
265. Sociologists of religion seem to be discovering the marketplace model of
religious competition that legal doctrine on religious liberty has long taken for
granted. See Warner, supra note 197, at 1045 (offering a "new paradigm," based
on "the idea that religious institutions in the United States operate within an
open market"). Sociologists and social historians are now offering evidence to
support the lawyers' claim that disestablishment explains much of the greater
vitality of religion in this country as compared to Europe. See GREELEY, supra
note 197, at 126-27 (reporting survey data showing no difference in religiosity
between United States and Great Britain among Catholics and non-Anglican
Protestants; "lower levels of religiousness in Great Britain are purely an
Anglican phenomenon"); Warner, supra note 197, at 1048-58.
266. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 67 (describing "the anti-Santeria coalition-animal rights activists,
Christian fundamentalists, and people who just seem to find animal sacrifice
disgusting").
267. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 264, No. 10, at 80 ("If a faction consists
of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which
enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote.").
268. See Laycock, supra note 266, at 57-58 (analyzing why secular interest
groups resist religious exemptions, illustrating with examples of landmarking
and gay rights lobbies).
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It is emphatically not my claim that the churches have been
innocent, either in the Reformation era or today. But I do
emphasize two points about the State: 1) in general, it was only
the State that had the power to persecute, and 2) either the
State or the Church could provide the motive to persecute.
Persecutions depend on the coercive power of the State.
Churches could persecute only when the religious authority of
the Church was combined with the governing authority of the
State, or when the Church usurped the State's monopoly of
legitimate violence. Occasional private persecutions, as in civil
wars, pogroms, and deprogramming, usually depend on the
instigation or at least the acquiescence of State; they always
depend on usurping the monopoly of legitimate violence.
Either Church or State could provide the motive for
persecution. The Church could urge or request the State to
persecute, or the State could persecute for its own reasons. The
evil was the same in either case: Human beings suffered for
their religious belief and practice.
The central meaning of separation of Church and State is to
separate these two sources of authority, depriving religion of the
State's power to coerce, and depriving the State of power over
religion. That separation accomplished, the State still has its
monopoly of legitimate violence. It has the power to regulate
and punish, to seize the property of individuals and groups, to
imprison them or execute them. The State, as always, remains
a direct threat to liberty.
The Church has only the power to persuade. Its members
have the power to compete for votes with all other citizens. And
while I would fear a government dominated by activists from the
Christian Coalition, I would equally fear a government domi-
nated by activists from the Environmental Defense Fund, the
National Organization of Women, the National Taxpayers
League, the Humane Society, the National Historic Trust, the
American Civil Liberties Union, or any other group with a strong
commitment to one or a few issues. The twentieth century has
produced Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and Pol Pot, and in our own
country terrorist bombs on behalf of peace, environmentalism,
the right to bear arms, and the liberation of Puerto Rico. It is
not that "religion" is "inherently intolerant and persecutory";
rather, the risk of intolerance and persecution is a risk of any
human movement organized for a common purpose. I see no
reason to believe that religion presents a risk different in kind
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or degree from the risk of secular ideologies." 9
B. REDUCTIONS IN FORCE AND IN THE STAKES OF
COMPETITION
Two obvious differences between Reformation-era conflicts
and our own are the levels of force and the stakes of the conflict.
Kathleen Sullivan's notion of the war of all against all provides
a useful point of departure. Criticizing Michael McConnell's
view that the evil is government-imposed religious homogeneity,
she says, "In other words, the war of all sects against all is to
continue by other means after the truce."70
I do not know exactly what Sullivan means by this, although
she cannot mean the apparent implication that McConnell's view
brings little improvement over the previous situation. Even if
she were right that the war of all against all continues "by other
means," the change in means would be one of the great advances
of human history. Instead of guns, burning stakes, and chopping
blocks, we use political organization, voting, litigation, free
debate, and attempts to structure rules of debate to exclude the
other side. This change is not complete; we also still use
criminal punishment and the threat of criminal punishment
against religiously motivated behavior." But we have made
great progress toward channeling the conflict into legal, political,
and social means, and away from violent means.
Equally important is a change that Sullivan does not
acknowledge, a reduction in the stakes of competition. The war
of all sects continues in the sense that sects may compete for
adherents and for their views of proper government policy. But
they may not compete to impose theology or forms of worship.
They may not admit to the goal of suppressing other faiths, and
in fact they rarely attempt it. The competition among sects is no
longer total war; it is no longer for the right to exist and practice
one's faith. These basic rights are largely conceded to all, and
serious believers have a much greater interest in uniting against
269. See Schwarzschild, supra note 230, at 910-15 ("Religion seems an odd
choice as prime threat to liberalism at the end of a century that has been so
greatly dominated by struggles over Communism, fascism, and extreme
nationalism.").
270. Sullivan, supra note 228, at 198.
271. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993) (striking down laws against religious sacrifice of animals);
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding application of drug
laws to religious use of peyote).
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the secularism that threatens them all.
The circle of toleration has expanded many fold since the
Reformation, and indeed, since the American founding. Catho-
lics, Jews, Mormons, Protestants of all types, humanists,
atheists, and agnostics are all within the circle. Hostility and
suspicion continues in some quarters, but tolerance is proclaimed
all around and the goal of suppression is repudiated.
The circle of toleration does not yet include the entire
population. Some groups are subjected to mistreatment that
readily fits the popular image of the Reformation-era-attempted
suppression because of overt religious hostility. A clear example
is deprogramming of so-called cult members: kidnapping and
physical coercion to force the victim to recant unacceptable
religious beliefs and practices. 2 Another example is the
ruinous jury verdicts against some of these unfamiliar religions,
mostly for torts committed by religious communications."'
Another example was the Hialeah City Council meeting to
consider the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye's attempt to open
a church at which it would practice animal sacrifice. Among the
reasons offered for prohibiting the church was that animal
sacrifice was sinful, "an abomination to the Lord," and the
worship of demons.274 But these examples of overt hostility to
minority religions as such are far removed from the principal
lines of conflict today.
C. THE CHANGING MOTIVES AND EXPANDED ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT
Today's religious conflicts are much more likely to be secular
versus religious instead of religious versus religious. The typical
oppressive measure directed at a religious group results from the
demands of some secular interest group and from the vastly
272. For an account, see J. Thomas Ungerleider & David K. Wellisch,
Deprogramming (Involuntary Departure), Coercion, and Cults, in CULTS AND
NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS 239, 239-42 (Mark Galanter ed., 1989).
273. See, e.g., Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532 (Cal.
App. 1992) ($30 million verdict, of which $2.5 million affirmed; in this case, the
judgment was not based just on religious communications) (unpublished
opinion); George v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 4 Cal. Rptr.
2d 473 (Cal. App. 1992) ($32.6 million verdict, of which $1.5 million affirmed
and punitive damage claims remanded for retrial) (unpublished opinion).
274. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
541 (1993) (plurality opinion). The record contains more in the same vein. I
represented the Church on appeal.
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expanded role of government. As government regulation and
government benefits become more pervasive, and as religion
becomes ever more pluralistic, government and religion interact
more often and in more complex ways.
Government burdens on religious exercise arise as incidents
of secular regulation or from eligibility requirements of benefit
programs, and rarely from one religion trying to suppress
another. Illustrative issues include whether the State must pay
unemployment compensation to a conscientious objector who quit
his job in a defense plant," whether historical landmark laws
can control the architecture of churches," 6 or whether Catholic
teaching hospitals must perform and teach the techniques of
abortion.7 Establishment Clause controversies arise from
private religious exercise in public places, 8 or from religious
participation in the distribution of government social ser-
vices,279 and only occasionally from direct government attempts
to support religion. Today's controversies are more complex and
harder to decide, and it is harder to treat the range of disputes
with theoretical consistency.
In addition, all sides are more prone to assert their alleged
275. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding such a worker
constitutionally entitled to unemployment compensation).
276. See Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996) (reinstating
one count of complaint alleging that historic zoning made it impossible to
expand church and thus forced church to turn worshipers away from mass);
Rector of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.
1990) (upholding New York's refusal to allow a church to demolish and replace
a landmarked building), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991).
277. St. Agnes Hosp. v. Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319, 320-32 (D. Md. 1990)
(holding that the state may require a Catholic hospital to teach abortion
techniques if it has residents in obstetrics and gynecology).
278. See, e.g., Capitol Square Rev. &Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440
(1995) (holding that a state that permits unattended displays in public forum
must permit unattended religious displays); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981) (holding that a state university that makes its facilities generally
available to student groups may not deny use of those facilities to a student
group desiring to use them for religious purposes).
279. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510
(1995) (holding that state university that funds wide range of student
publications from student activity fees cannot deny funding because a
publication is religious); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1
(1993) (holding that the Establishment Clause is not violated by a public school
district paying the salary of a sign language interpreter in a parochial school);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding that the state could
reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children to parochial
school).
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rights than in the past. The culture wars make interest groups
and regulators less receptive to pleas of religious liberty, less
willing to exempt religious minorities from regulation even when
the cost to the regulatory scheme is mostly symbolic." ° Many
secularists see little reason to accommodate an incomprehensible
superstition that has lingered beyond its time, and many
modernist believers see no reason why anyone's religious belief
should affect the pursuit of public policy. Secular movements on
both left and right exhibit the same tendency to excess and
absolutism that we see in some religious movements.
The Supreme Court seems confident that it can distinguish
deliberate suppression of religious exercise from general laws
that suppress religious exercise only incidentally. In the Court's
view, only deliberate suppression raises a constitutional
question.28'
Suzanna Sherry has defended that distinction in originalist
terms that are directly relevant to my review of the Reformation:
[T]he founding generation had no idea that government might be so
involved in the lives of the people as to prohibit ordinary, everyday
practices that affect religion. Advocates of the religion clauses feared
deliberate persecution, not unforeseen general government growth with
a negative impact on religion. 2
The originalist question, as Justice Brennan once said,
should be whether a practice threatens those "consequences
which the Framers deeply feared."28 The evil of the Refor-
mation-era conflict was that the State with its coercive power
made human beings suffer for their religious belief and practice;
that was the consequence the Founders feared. The evil is the
280. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274,282-83
(Alaska) (asserting a "transactional" compelling interest in eliminatmg marital
status discrimination in every housing transaction, without evidence that
unmarried couples had difficulty finding housing), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460
(1994).
281. Compare Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993) (holding that regulation that targets religion or discriminates
against religion must be justified by compelling interest) with Employment Div.
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that neutral and generally applicable
laws may be applied to suppress core religious practices, and that such
application requires no justification).
282. Sherry, supra note 246, at 148. I will not repeat here all the reasons
for thinking that the Court was wrong. See generally Laycock, supra note 266;
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990).
283. School Dist. ofAbington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,236 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
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same, whatever the State's motive. Employment Division v.
Smith284 threatens that consequence; the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act 28 5 attempts to avoid it. My disagreement with
Professor Sherry illustrates the familiar problem of the level of
generality at which to state a principle. When the evil is human
suffering, the sufferer is penalized because of his religious
practice, and the State infficts the suffering, focusing on the
State's motive seems to miss the point.
In addition, more than one inference can be drawn from
Professor Sherry's historical assumption. She is largely right
that the Founders "had no idea that government might be so
involved in the lives of the people as to prohibit ordinary,
everyday practices that affect religion." The Founders encoun-
tered this problem, and granted legislative exemptions, but the
issue arose only occasionally.2 6 The Founders knew about
governments that would prevent a disfavored faith from building
a church at all; they presumably could not imagine a govern-
ment that would prevent a mainstream church from adding
needed worship space because architecture buffs liked the old
building.28 But I doubt they would have thought one of these
governments less tyrannical than the other, or that they would
have thought that only one of these governments had prohibited
the free exercise of religion.
Professor Sherry reasons that the Founders would not have
thought to forbid something they could not antici-
pate-suppression of religious practice by an activist government
acting for secular reasons. But it is equally clear that the
Founders did not think to authorize this thing they could not
anticipate. The question is whether a novel threat to religious
liberty falls within the principle of the Religion Clauses; the
Founders' failure to anticipate the novel threat does not answer
that question. To assume that it does is an error analogous to
excluding Mormons and Jehovah's Witnesses from the Free
Exercise Clause, television from the Free Press Clause, and wire
taps from the Search and Seizure Clause.
284. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
285. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to § 2000bb-4 (1994).
286. See McConnell, Origins, supra note 143, at 1466-73.
287. These are the facts of Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir.
1996) (upholding the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to § 2000bb-4 (1994). I should disclose that I represented
Archbishop Flores on appeal.
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Finally, recall that the Reformation-era governments often
acted for their own secular reasons, even in religious matters.
That is, part of the evil known to the Founders was religious
persecution for secular motives, which is not so different from
today's "neutral and generally applicable laws"-enacted for
secular reasons but with the effect of suppressing a religious
practice.288
One of the most famous Reformation examples might itself
be described as a neutral and generally applicable law if
adjudicated today under the Free Exercise Clause. In Henry's
England, it was treason to question the validity of his second
marriage. 2 " This prohibition was based on the strongest
reason of national security. If his second marriage were invalid,
the children of that marriage would be illegitimate; the claim of
illegitimacy would challenge their right to the throne and
threaten civil war over the succession. This particular form of
treason was committed by stating a core Catholic belief, but the
law applied to everyone and was stated in religiously neutral
terms. Perhaps the example goes away because if it were
litigated today, the law would be struck down under the Free
Speech Clause or the Treason Clause.2 '0 Even so, I think the
example further undermines the claim that neutral and gener-
ally applicable laws were no part of the problem the Founders
sought to solve.
Disagreement over the validity of Henry's marriage turned
on an underlying religious disagreement, but the underlying
religious basis for the law would probably not keep it from being
neutral and generally applicable under current doctrine.
Employment Division v. Smith29' relied on Braunfeld v.
292Brown, which upheld the conviction of an Orthodox Jewish
merchant for selling retail goods on Sunday. Plainly an
underlying religious disagreement over the proper designation
of the Sabbath was at the heart of this prosecution. But the
288. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
289. The First Act of Succession, 1534, 25 Henry 8, ch. 22 (Eng.), reprinted
in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE, supra note 57, at 232, 238-39.
290. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 ("Treason against the United States, shall
consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies,
giving them Aid and Comfort. No person shall be convicted of Treason unless
on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in
open Court.").
291. 494 U.S. 872, 880 (1990).
292. 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (plurality opinion).
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Court separated the rather modest secular functions of the
Sunday closing law from its religious origins; the secular
functions assertedly made it neutral and generally applicable.
Similarly, a court could easily separate the underlying religious
dispute from the critical secular function of Henry's marriage
and of the law commanding respect for that marriage.
Another contemporary example of allegedly neutral laws
with religious underpinnings is the landmarking of churches. In
the wake of Smith, lower courts have held that landmarking
laws are neutral and generally applicable,293 even though they
apply only to certain properties and thus affected property
owners do not get the protection that the political process
provides against oppression by laws that burden everybody. One
study found that churches are landmarked at a rate more than
forty-two times higher than any other kind of property.294
Why? Because the landmark lobby appears to like sacred
architecture. As Emily Hartigan has said in conversation, they
want "the faint after-aroma of religion," but not the real thing.
I do not believe that landmark laws are neutral and generally
applicable, but if the courts say they are, Henry's treason law
would be so a fortiori.
A religious disagreement underlies all neutral and generally
applicable laws that burden religion, at least in the sense that
the State rejects the minority's religious belief. Just as Henry
rejected the Catholic belief that only the Pope could annul his
marriage to Catherine, so Oregon rejected the belief that one can
directly experience the presence of God through peyote intoxi-
cation,295 and Wisconsin rejected the belief that a simple life
without a high school education better conforms to God's
will.296 The law would have been different if a sufficient block
of voters had been peyote worshipers or Old Order Amish, just
as the treason law would have been different if Henry had re-
mained Catholic. The fundamental split between secular and
religious worldviews informs all disputes about exempting
religious minorities from regulation.
293. Rector of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348,
354-55 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991).
294. N.J. L'Heureux, Jr., Ministry v. Mortar: A Landmark Conflict, in
GOVERNfENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 2, at 164, 168 (Dean M.
Kelley ed., 1986).
295. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
296. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
1996] 1101
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1047
I do not mean to impute any of these thoughts to the
Founders except the most basic one: They did not want people
to suffer for their religious beliefs and practices. The sug-
gestions in this section are not offered as original intent in the
sense that the Founders consciously thought about these things.
Rather, they are offered as part of the related practice of
interpreting a provision in light of the evil it was intended to
remedy. The religious conflict in the wake of the Reformation
was the most salient example of the evil to be avoided, and a
major part of that example was government dominating religion,
persecuting religious dissenters, and interfering in religious
matters for reasons of state.
CONCLUSION
My view of the central lesson to be drawn from the Refor-
mation should not be a surprise; it is consistent with our basic
constitutional theory. The Constitution was written on the
assumption that the concentration of powers necessary to an
effective government is a threat to human liberty, and that those
powers must be divided and constrained. The Bill of Rights
protects the people from the government, not the other way
around. The state-action distinction is drawn with special
sharpness in the Religion Clauses: Religious belief and practice
by private persons is specially protected; the same religious
belief or practice by government is specifically prohibited. The
puzzle is why the opposite assumption-that the Religion
Clauses protect the government from religious citizens-has
become so widespread.
In part it is because those who hold that view have misread
history. They have blamed too much on the Church and too
little on the State. In part it is because they have thought that
their preferred secular ideologies were inherently different from
religion, and that religion is uniquely susceptible to the temp-
tation to intolerance and absolutism. I think that they are
wrong on each of these points.
The First Amendment constrains Congress, not churches,
and this is no accident. The amendment was aimed squarely at
the problem the Founders sought to solve. During the Refor-
mation and today, it was and is governments that punish people
for religious beliefs and practices. The most common motives
have changed, the alignment of factions has changed, but the
central evil has remained the same.
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